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CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND
DEMOCRATIC POLITICS: REFLECTIONS ON
THE INTERPRETIVE APPROACH OF
BAKER v. CARR
GUY-URIEL E. CHARLES*

Baker v. Carr is one of the Supreme Court's most important
opinions, not least because its advent signaled the constitutionalization
of democracy. Unfortunately, as is typical of the Court's numerous
forays into democratic politics, the decision is not accompanied by an
apparent vision of the relationship among democratic practice,
constitutional law, and democratic theory. In this Article, Professor
Charles revisits Baker and provides several democraticprinciples that
he argues justifies the Court's decision to engage the democratic
process. He examines the decision from the perspective of one of its
chief contemporary critics, Justice Frankfurter. He sketches an
approach, described as constitutional pluralism, for thinking about
Baker and other cases involving judicial supervision of democratic
politics. Using constitutional pluralism as an interpretive tool, he
argues that the aim of judicialinvolvement in democraticpolitics ought
to be to vindicate specific democratic principles. To the extent that a
challenged democratic practice serves multiple and legitimate
democratic ends, the federal courts should respect the judgment of
democratic actors.
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INTRODUCTION

If Baker v. Carr?was ever controversial, it is no longer so.2 The
decision has not only enjoyed near-universal acceptance, it is also
recognized as one of the Court's finest moments.3 Baker is widely
hailed for at least two reasons. First, the decision has had a
remarkable effect on the political landscape. As one commentator
has noted, Baker "brought about massive, nationwide political reform
where before prospects for change had been hopeless. 4 Second,
Baker represents the constitutionalization of democratic politics, and
opened the door to judicial regulation of democracy.5 Following
Baker, the Court has decided cases involving the regulation of
political parties,6 access to ballots,7 racial redistricting, 8 the role of
1. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. John Hart Ely, Standing To Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders,111 HARV. L.
REV.576, 577 n.7 (1997) (stating that Baker is "now conventionally recognized ...as
among the Court's more legitimate and successful interventions").
3. Abner J. Mikva, Justice Brennan and the PoliticalProcess: Assessing the Legacy of
Baker v. Carr, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 683,685.
4. Id.
5. Rick Pildes defines the constitutionalization of democracy as the process of
subjecting the "fundamental structure of democratic processes and institutions to
constitutional constraint." See Richard H. Pildes, ConstitutionalizingDemocraticPolitics,
in A BADLY FLAWED ELECTION: DEBATING BUSH V. GORE, THE SUPREME COURT,
AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1 (Ronald Dworkin ed., forthcoming 2002).
6. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 569-86 (2000) (holding that
California's blanket primary system violates a political party's First Amendment right of
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partisanship in the political process, 9 and campaign finance reform'to name some of the more prominent categories.

Notwithstanding the importance of Baker, one of the opinion's
glaring weaknesses is the Court's failure to defend its decision to
supervise the political process.

Most pertinently, the Court

essentially disregarded Justice Frankfurter's remonstrations that the
Constitution did not provide any guidance to the federal courts to

justify judicial supervision of the political process." The essence of
Frankfurter's dissent in Baker was a contention that the
Constitution's text, history, and structure do not dictate any particular
theory.12 From this observation, Frankfurter reasoned that in the

absence of constitutional guidance, no neutral principle exists for
picking such a political theory. 3 Consequently, courts have no
legitimate warrant for doing so and the lack of such legitimacy would
cause compliance problems.
The Court's only response on this score was the retort that

"judicial standards under the Equal Protection Clause are welldeveloped and familiar."' 4 As a consequence of the Court's failure to

defend judicial supervision of the political process, the Court ignored
a number of important questions that continue to beset judicial
association); Eu v. S.F. County Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 216 (1989)
(rejecting several statutory restrictions on the organization and activities of political
parties as non-compelling violations of the party's First Amendment rights).
7. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 430 (1992) (holding Hawaii's prohibition on
write-in votes constitutional); Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 710 (1974) (holding
unconstitutional a California statute requiring a filing fee to be paid by an indigent
candidate wishing to be placed on the ballot).
8. See Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 257 (2001) (rejecting as clearly erroneous
the district court's finding that racial considerations predominated in the drawing of North
Carolina's twelfth congressional district); Shaw v. Reno, 503 U.S. 630, 642 (1993) (holding
that appellants had stated an equal protection claim alleging an impermissible use of race
in redistricting).
9. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986) (finding political gerrymandering
to be a justiciable issue); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 736 (1973) (considering an
equal protection challenge to a Connecticut reapportionment plan).
10. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978) (holding
statutory limitations on corporate expenditures for political issues unconstitutional);
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding individual political
contribution limits).
11. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,289-97 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
12. See id.(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
13. See id. at 295-97 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
14. Id.at 226. Professor Fuentes-Rohwer's important contribution to this Symposium
argues that judicial standards were in fact available under the Equal Protection Clause and
that lower courts were able to resolve apportionment disputes post-Baker. See Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, Baker's Promise, Equal Protection, and the Modern Redistricting
Revolution: A Pleafor Rationality, 80 N.C. L. REv 1353, 1366-68 (2002).
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supervision of democratic politics. For example, when and why
should federal courts intervene in the political process? 15 What role
can and should the courts play in resolving political disputes? And
perhaps more importantly, do the federal courts have a constitutional
or political theory to guide their path through this political thicket? 6
These are the challenges that confronted the Baker majority and
continue to confront the Court today.
This Article argues that Baker v. Carr is best understood as a
case that attempts to limit, through judicial supervision of the political
process, the excesses of democratic politics. I term this approach
"constitutional pluralism." My point of departure is that judicial
review of democratic politics must be evaluated from a
multidimensional continuum. Constitutionalization of democratic
politics-and consequently judicial supervision of the political
process-finds its strongest justification when democratic practices do
not serve any legitimate democratic ends and violate multiple
democratic principles. Conversely, judicial supervision of the political
process is least justified (if at all) where democratic practices serve
democratic ends and judicial review does not vindicate any
democratic principles. Some of the principles that I identify in this
Article are majoritarianism, responsiveness, substantial equality, and
interest representation. 7 Assuming that the case for judicial
abstention from democratic politics is unpersuasive on practical or
institutional grounds, the issue becomes which principles guide the
15. Pamela S. Karlan, Nothing Personal: The Evolution of the Newest Equal
ProtectionFrom Shaw v. Reno to Bush v. Gore, 79 N.C. L. REv. 1345, 1345 (2001).
16. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, PoliticsAs Markets: PartisanLockups of
the DemocraticProcess, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 716 (1998) (concluding that the Court's
theory is "unsophisticated and underdeveloped").
17. Of course this is not an exhaustive list, nor is it meant to be. I have written
elsewhere on the importance of political association as a democratic value. See Guy-Uriel
E. Charles, Race, Political Participation & the Right of Political Association: The First
Amendment Implications of the Court's Racial Districting Doctrine (Apr. 12, 2002)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with The North Carolina Law Review). Alternatively,
one may argue, as have Professors Issacharoff and Pildes, that political competition is a
core democratic value. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Oversight of Regulated Political
Markets, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 91, 100 (2000) (drawing a partial comparison
between "competitive political processes" and "the competitive search for efficiency ... in
other markets"); Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political
Parties,AssociationalFreedoms,and PartisanCompetition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 31213 (2001) (noting that "the modern political party is the engine of democratic participation
and competition"); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 16, at 715-16 (noting that political
parties are a core part of democracy); Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political
Competition, 85 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1611 (1999) ("The way to sustain the constitutional
values of American democracy is often through the more indirect strategy of ensuring
appropriately competitive interorganizational conditions.").
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Court as it interprets the Constitution to regulate democratic

politics.'8

The argument presented here is that the Court should

utilize democratic principles to direct its interpretation of the

Constitution. Thus, judicial review would be warranted only where
politics fail to give effect to core democratic principles.

9

A necessary implication of this approach is that democratic
theory is an indispensable guide in the judicial supervision of

democratic politics- 0 Put differently, federal courts, in particular the
Supreme Court, should not disturb the democratic process unless the
Court can identify at least one fundamental democratic principle that
would be vindicated by judicial review. This Article advocates that
the Court explicitly reads democratic principles, primarily drawn
from political theory, as a method of regulating law and politics and
interpreting the Constitution.
Constitutional pluralism is an
interpretive approach that mines democratic theory to ascertain the

aims and purposes of democratic politics and to bridge the gap
between the constitutional text and democratic practice.2' I suppose
18. History is certainly helpful in some contexts, but in the context of law and politics,
history is more often than not a poor shepherd.
19. Constitutional pluralism may be related to the expressive harms approach
popularized by Professor Pildes, with at least one important conceptual difference. See
Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "BizarreDistricts," and Voting
Rights: Evaluating Election-DistrictAppearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REv.
483, 506-07 (1996) (arguing that public policies can violate the Constitution if they do not
reflect the proper respect for public values). Whereas the expressive harms approach is
concerned with the meaning of governmental action, constitutional pluralism is concerned
with the concrete and actual costs that result when democratic principles are abandoned.
Additionally, the expressive harms approach asks the Court to interpret the social
meaning of state action and to incorporate social meaning into constitutional
interpretation. See id. at 508-09. In contrast, constitutional pluralism expects the Court to
recognize the principles that make democratic politics possible and to incorporate those
principles into its constitutional interpretation. Finally, an expressive harm is triggered
when the State abandons other values in favor of a single one. Id. at 509. Constitutional
pluralism may be triggered where the State ignores an important democratic value, even
though other democratic values are minimally reflected in representative structures.
20. For arguments on the importance of democratic theory to judicial supervision of
politics, see Heather K. Gerken, New Wine in Old Bottles: A Comment on Richard
Hasen's and Richard Briffault's Essays on Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 407
(forthcoming 2002), available at http://www.law.fsu.edu/journalsllawreview/downloads/
292/Gerken.pdf; Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83
(1997). But see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS
Do 50 (2001) ("My basic suggestion is that people can often agree on constitutional
practices, and even on constitutional rights, when they cannot agree on constitutional
theories. In other words, well-functioning constitutional orders try to solve problems,
including problems of deliberative trouble, through reaching incompletely theorized
agreements.").
21. As some leading commentators have explained, "American courts facing
contemporary questions of democratic principles today often have to construct a
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the incorporation of those principles into the constitutional structure
as a matter of interpretive necessity, though they are not admittedly
part of the constitutional text.P
Part I of this Article reviews Justice Frankfurter's arguments in
both Colegrove v. Green and Baker. Frankfurter's objections are
worth exploring in detail both because they present a forceful
articulation of the stakes of judicial involvement in democratic
politics and because they are perennial objections to judicial
supervision of the democratic process. Part II addresses Frankfurter's
concerns and argues that Baker is best understood as a case that
legitimates judicial interference with the political process when state

actors abandon core democratic principles, even in the single-minded
pursuit of an otherwise legitimate democratic purpose. Part II
describes this interpretive approach as constitutional pluralism and
explores four core principles of democratic politics that were violated
by Tennessee's apportionment scheme in Baker.23
I. FRANKFURTER'S OBJECTIONS

Baker was not the Court's first encounter with the problem of
malapportionment. Though many suits were filed challenging gross
population disparities in various states, the Court refused to
adjudicate these disputes on their merits.24 Most of the cases were
disposed of by per curiam opinions that relied upon Colegrove v.
Green,2I

one of the

Court's earliest pronouncements

on the

justiciability of malapportionment.
conception of democracy with less textual and historical foundation than in some other
areas of constitutional law." SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN & RICHARD
H. PILDES, THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 20 (2d ed. 2001).
22. Those principles must necessarily be incorporated into the constitutional
structure, otherwise democratic politics, particularly the American brand-liberal,
republican, and constitutional-is impossible to sustain. My approach is simply honest
and explicit with respect to this incorporation.
23. I ignore for the time being some important details. For example, I leave for later
exploration the implications of constitutional pluralism for other disputes, such as whether
Reynolds v. Sims was correctly decided or whether the political and racial gerrymandering
cases were correctly decided.
24. See, e.g., Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S.
916 (1958); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956);
Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v.
Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Tedesco v. Bd. of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); South v.
Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950); MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948); Colegrove v.
Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1946); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675 (1946); Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
25. 328 U.S. at 549.
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In Colegrove, Justice Frankfurter articulated a defense of the
Court's refusal to adjudicate reapportionment disputes. Justice
Frankfurter's apologia in Colegrove, which is revisited in his Baker
dissent, is fundamentally an argument about the proper role of the

judiciary in the political process. Frankfurter's arguments fall into
four different, though related, categories: institutional boundaries;
institutional impotence; institutional competence; and judicial
legitimacy. These concerns led Frankfurter to the Hobbesian
conclusion that citizens have no judicial recourse against the ills of
population inequality, but rather must rely upon their representatives
to provide relief against malapportionment.26
Examining Frankfurter's concerns in Colegrove is important in
part because doing so helps us better understand Baker.
Understanding Frankfurter's objections to Baker is also important
because his protestations to the constitutionalization of democratic
politics reflect recurring concerns in constitutional law regarding the
role of the judiciary in the democratic process. Of his four objections
to judicial supervision of the democratic process, Frankfurter was
most worried about judicial legitimacy; his concern was that judicial
supervision of democratic politics would undermine the Court's
authority and the faith that political actors and the electorate place in
the Court. If the Court's legitimacy is undermined, both the
electorate and political elites will be less likely to abide by the Court's
decisions. Consequently, the Court will be less able to fulfill its
institutional tasks.27 To better appreciate these concerns, let us look
carefully at Frankfurter's conception of the role of the judiciary.
26. Compare THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 217-22 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1988)
(1651) ("From hence it followeth, that when the Actor maketh a Covenant by Authority,
he bindeth thereby the Author, no lesse than if he had made it himselfe; and no lesse
subjecteth him to all the consequences of the same."), and Hanna Pitkin, Hobbes's
Concept of Representation-, 58 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 328, 329 (1964) (concluding that
Hobbes's concept of representation "comes to be a way of establishing the unlimited
authority of the sovereign, and his subjects' unlimited obligation to obey."), with
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) ("Whether Congress faithfully discharges its
duty or not, the subject has been committed to the exclusive control of Congress."), and
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In a democratic
society like ours, relief must come through an aroused popular conscience that sears the
conscience of the people's representatives.").
27. As I argue in Part ll.A, the concern that Baker would undermine the Court's
legitimacy, interestingly, turns out to be the worry that has been vindicated the least by
history, Bush v. Gore notwithstanding. Remarkably, the Court continued (and continues)
to decide deeply political issues without significantly leveraging its authority. See generally
John C. Yoo, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 778-81, 791
(2001) (arguing that the Court will survive Bush v. Gore with its reputation relatively
unharmed). Further, with the exception of Frankfurter's argument that the judiciary is
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InstitutionalBoundaries

Frankfurter's leading salvo against judicial supervision of the
democratic process is the argument that regulating politics takes the
Court outside of its constitutionally prescribed institutional
boundaries s His argument is that were the Court to adjudicate
political disputes it would invade the institutional domains of the
political branches. Thus, in Colegrove, Frankfurter maintained that it
"is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the
politics of the people."2 9
This institutional boundaries argument is advanced on three
major fronts. Frankfurter looked to the text, to the structure, and
practices of the Constitution to support his contention that the courts
should not adjudicate political disputes.
1. The Text
Frankfurter concluded that the Court should stay its hand in
reapportionment cases in part because reapportionment is a matter
clearly committed to other branches by the Constitution and from
which the Court "has been excluded by the clear intention of the
Constitution."3
Though he acknowledges that malapportioned
congressional districts are "evils" under a proper interpretation of the
Constitution,31 these are not the types of evils that the Constitution
empowers the federal courts to remedy. 32 As he notes in Colegrove,
the "short of it is that the Constitution has conferred upon Congress
exclusive authority to secure fair representation by the States in the
popular House and left to that House determination [of] whether
'33
States have fulfilled their responsibilities.

incompetent to adequately supervise the democratic process, Frankfurter's predictions of
doom have not materialized. For a similar argument by Professor Schuck, see Peter H.
Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of
Politics,87 COLUM. L. REv. 1325, 1377-84 (1987).
28. Baker,369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
29. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 553-54; see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 287 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) ("The crux of the matter is that courts are not fit instruments of decision where
what is essentially at stake is the composition of those large contests of policy traditionally
fought out in non-judicial forums, by which governments and the actions of governments
are made and unmade.").
30. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554.
31. Id.
32. Id. ("The Constitution of the United States gives ample power to provide against
these evils. But due regard for the Constitution as a viable system precludes judicial
correction.").
33. Id.
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In Baker, Frankfurter contrasted the "cases involving Negro
disfranchisement" as examples of the Court fulfilling the role
designated for it by the Constitution. 34 Unlike the reapportionment
cases, the cases in which the Court facilitated the right of African
Americans to participate in the political process-for example the
White Primary Cases-were adjudicated pursuant to an "explicit and
clear constitutional imperative. '35 A "compelling motive of the Civil
Rights Amendments," Frankfurter assured us, was to usher an "end
of discrimination against" African Americans.36 Consequently, those
cases cannot serve as persuasive precedent sufficient to compel a
broad argument in favor of judicial review of the political process.
2. Constitutional Practices and Structure
Frankfurter's attempt to determine the "inherent limits" of the
Court's power is not grounded solely in the text of the Constitution.
Frankfurter employed two additional methods of interpretation to
support the textual argument. He examined past and extant practices
and drew inferences from the structure of the Constitution.
For example in Colegrove, Frankfurter maintained that federal
courts may not enter the political thicket even when "Congress may
have been in default in exacting from states obedience to its
mandate" to apportion or when Congress itself "has at times been
heedless ... and not apportioned according to the requirements of

the Census." 37 As he argued, whether or not Congress has mandated
population equality, as it had done from time to time, and whether or
not the states have complied, as they seldom did, it "never occurred
to anyone that this Court could issue mandamus to compel Congress
to perform its mandatory duty to apportion" or to exact obedience
from the states to its mandate. 8 No one has ever thought to complain
to the Court to compel Congress to perform even though
"[t]hroughout our history, whatever may have been the controlling
Apportionment Act, the most glaring disparities have prevailed as to
the contours and the population of districts." 39 From the evidence of
these "glaring disparities," Frankfurter concluded that to "sustain
this
'
action would cut very deep into the very being of Congress. 40
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Baker, 369 U.S. at 285 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 285-86 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 554-55.
I& at 555.

39. 1&
40. 1& at 555-56.
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But evidence of contemporary practices does not tell us why this
is an area in which congressional supremacy is unlimited and
complete. To appreciate the nature of congressional power, and
concomitantly, the proper role of federal courts, we have to
understand the structure of the Constitution. "The Constitution has
many commands that are not enforceable by courts because they
clearly fall outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe
judicial action."41 These self-enforcing mechanisms include the
constitutional requirement that states remit fugitives from sister
states, 42 violation of the command that laws are to be faithfully
executed,43 and of course, the "great guaranty of a republican form of
government."'
Thus, Frankfurter was able to conclude that the
structure of the Constitution "has left the performance of many duties
in our governmental scheme to depend on the fidelity of the
executive and legislative action and, ultimately, on the vigilance of the
people in exercising their political rights." 45 In his view, the Court did
not have a role to play.
Frankfurter's reliance on constitutional structure and practice as
a method of interpretation is most prominently articulated in his
dissent in Baker.
Responding to the argument that
malapportionment violates the Equal Protection Clause, Frankfurter
relied first on the textual argument that the Constitution does not
expressly authorize federal courts to guarantee population equality in
apportionment. 46 In support of that textual argument, he reasoned
from past and contemporary practices as well as from the structure of
the Constitution.
His assumption is that the Fourteenth Amendment is a
"historical product"'47 that can be interpreted in light of past and
present practices. To the extent past and present practices support
the contention that substantial equality in apportionment is a
fundamental prerequisite to representative democracy, these
practices provide some clues to the federal courts regarding their
proper role in the political process. Frankfurter's inquiry is whether:

41. Id at 556.
42. Id (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2).
43. Id. (citing Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866)).
44. Id. (citing Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1911)).
45. Id.
46. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 285-86 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see supra
text accompanying notes 30-33.
47. Baker, 369 U.S. at 302 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (quoting Jackman v.
Rosenbaum Co., 260 U.S. 22,31 (1922)).
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[R]epresentation proportioned to the geographic spread of
population is so universally accepted as a necessary element
of equality between man and man that it must be taken to be
the standard of political equality preserved by the
Fourteenth Amendment-that it is

...

"the basic principle

of representative government. ... "I
Of course, Frankfurter concluded that past and contemporary
practices do not support the contention that population equality is
necessary to representative government. As he notes:
[Population equality] was not the English system, it was not
the colonial system, it was not the system chosen for the
national government by the Constitution, it was not the
system exclusively or even predominantly practiced by the
States at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment, it is not predominantly practiced by the States
today4 9
In so far as past and present practices are probative of the importance
of population equality, they do not support the majority's
proposition °
Frankfurter is not content to leave the point there. Past and
present practices do not simply undermine the contention that
substantial population equality is a necessary precondition in a
constitutional democracy, they also demonstrate that "there is notas there has never been-a standard by which the place of equality as
a factor in apportionment can be measured." 51 This absence of
standards links adjudication of democratic politics under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Guarantee Clause-the constitutional
boogeyman. For Frankfurter, cases arising out of the Guarantee
5 2
Clause challenge the very structure of representative institutions
As he stated in Colegrove, the basis for these types of suits is that the
polity suffers a wrong qua polity 3 Indeed, the problem with these
48. Id at 301 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
49. Id (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also id. at 301-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
50. See, e.g., id at 319-24 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (providing contemporary
examples of American apportionment schemes).
51. Id at 322-23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
52. Id at 295 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("In determining ... [Guarantee Clause
issues] non-justiciable, the Court was sensitive to the same considerations to which its later
decisions have given the varied applications already discussed. It adverted to the delicacy
of judicial intervention into the very structure of government.").
53. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,552 (1945) ("This is not an action to recover for
damage because of the discriminatory exclusion of a plaintiff from rights enjoyed by other
citizens. The basis for the suit is not a private wrong, but a wrong suffered by Illinois as a
polity.").
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types of suits is that they do not provide clear standards for effective
judicial supervision of the political process. 4
Frankfurter argued that reapportionment cases under the
Fourteenth Amendment are eerily similar to Guarantee Clause cases
because both challenge the form and structure of government.55
Given that adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause would be
demonstrably indistinguishable from the Guarantee Clause, the Court
should not rely on the Equal Protection Clause to provide
constitutional content and restraint on democratic politics. 56 Once
54. Baker's rejection of Frankfurter's conception of the Court's role in Colegrove
perhaps represents an important paradigm shift. Frankfurter in Colegrove conceived of
the Court's role as limited to providing individual relief in cases in which individual rights,
narrowly construed, were violated. Frankfurter distinguished individual rights cases from
cases that challenge the structural framework of the political process. Frankfurter's draws
this distinction-individual rights versus structural rights-from Justice Holmes's opinion
in Giles v. Harris,189 U.S. 475 (1903). In Giles, Justice Holmes, writing for the majority,
rejected an equitable claim by Black plaintiffs challenging the State of Alabama's refusal
to allow them to vote. Justice Holmes concluded, "relief from a great political wrong, if
done, as alleged, by the people of a state and the state itself, must be given by them or by
the legislative and political department of the United States." Giles, 189 U.S. at 488. One
can hear in Justice Frankfurter's distinction in Colegrove between private wrongs and
political wrongs echoes of Holmes's similar distinction in Giles. As Professor Issacharoff
notes, Giles "introduced an immediate division between claims concerning malfunctioning
of the political process and claims of narrowly focused individual rights." Samuel
Issacharoff, The Structures of DemocraticPolitics, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 593, 595 (2000).
For a wonderful overview of the Giles litigation, see generally Richard Pildes, Democracy,
Anti-Democracy, and the Cannon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 295 (2000). In Baker, Justice
Brennan treats Justice Frankfurter's distinction between private and structural wrongs as a
standing issue and rejects the implication that the judicial power is limited to resolving
private disputes. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 206-07 & n.27. As I argue in this Article, this
structural move makes it possible to understand Baker and justify the Court's increased
supervision of democratic politics in teleological terms. Unfortunately, as Professor
Issacharoff notes, following Baker, "the Warren Court sought to outfit the emerging
federal constitutional oversight of the political process in the unbecoming garb of
individual rights of individual rights of participation."
Issacharoff, supra, at 595.
However, as Professor Karlan has demonstrated recently, the Court has been unable to
escape the structural justifications for regulating democratic politics. See Karlan, supra
note 15, at 1346 ("The Court deploys the Equal Protection Clause not to protect the rights
of an identifiable group of individuals, particularly a group unable to protect itself through
operation of the normal political processes, but rather to regulate the institutional
arrangements within which politics is conducted.").
55. Baker, 369 U.S. at 297 (Frankfuter, J., dissenting) ("The present case ... is, in
effect, a Guarantee Clause claim masquerading under a different label.").
56. Frankfurter goes on to make the persuasive argument that the Court cannot
interpret the Equal Protection Clause without first coming to terms with the meaning of
the Guarantee Clause. He maintains, "a court could not determine the equal-protection
issue without in fact first determining the Republican-Form issue, simply because what is
reasonable for equal-protection purposes will depend upon what frame of government,
basically, is allowed. To divorce 'equal protection' from 'Republican Form' is to talk
about half a question." Baker,369 U.S. at 301 (Frankfuter, J., dissenting); see also Stanley
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again, Frankfurter combines evidence from past and present practices
with a structural argument to strengthen the contention that
regulating the political process is not a role delegated to the federal
courts by the Constitution.
B. InstitutionalImpotence
The next arrow in Frankfurter's quiver is aimed right at the heart
of the judiciary as an institution. With this argument, Frankfurter
warned of the "futility of judicial intervention." 57 Here, Frankfurter
reminded the judiciary of its precarious place in the constitutional
structure due to its lack of stature and power. The "Court's
authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction."58
1. State Actors as Necessary Constitutional Partners
What happens if the Court orders the states to apportion
according to some standard of substantial political equality and the
states refuse to comply? For Frankfurter, state actors are necessary
partners in the enterprise of constitutionalism; the Court depends
upon them to carry out its orders.
Though this point is semi-interred in the various opinions in
Colegrove and Baker, one wonders to what extent various Justices
were concerned with the possibility that some states may have refused
to comply with a judicially imposed remedy. 59 Consider Justice
Rutledge's concurrence in Colegrove as a point of departure. Justice
Rutledge explained that were it not for the Court's decision in Smiley

H. Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its
Implications for American Federalism, 29 Cml. L. REV. 673, 692 (1962) (accord).

Frankfurter was thus keenly aware that Baker fundamentally compelled the Court to think
about the structural composition of representative institutions. The Court is obligated to
inquire "into the theoretic base of representation in an acceptably republican state."
Baker,369 U.S. at 301 (Frankfuter, J., dissenting).
57. Baker,369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
58. 1d (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
59. See, e.g., Thomas I. Emerson, MalapportionmentandJudicialPower,72 YALE Li.
64 (1962). Emerson writes:
The greatest danger facing the courts in dealing with the question of remedies
has been that legislative or executive officials would refuse to comply with
remedial decrees. The spectre of open conflict between the courts, "possessed
neither of the purse nor the sword," and officials of other branches, fired with
partisan zeal and threatened in their very political existence, has continually
haunted the judiciary.
Id. at 75-76.
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v. Holm,' which he considered binding in Colegrove, he would find
that the issues presented in Colegrove were non-justiciable. He
continues:
[W]e have but recently been admonished again that it is the
very essence of our duty to avoid decision upon grave
constitutional questions, especially when this may bring our
function into clash with the political departments of the
Government, if any tenable alternative
ground for disposing
61
of the controversy is presented.
Though he was unable to find a tenable alternative in Smiley, one was
purportedly apparent in Colegrove.62
The "gravity of the
constitutional questions raised [by Colegrove is] so great, together
with the possibilities for collision" that federal courts should decline
to exercise their jurisdiction in a "cause of so delicate a character." 63
But what is it that made this cause "so delicate a character?"
And what did he mean by the "possibilities for collision?" Justice
Rutledge provided some clues in the subsequent paragraphs of his
concurrence. The relief sought "pitches this Court into delicate
relation to the functions of state officials and Congress, compelling
them to take action which heretofore they have declined to take
voluntarily ..... I
Perhaps more importantly, Justice Rutledge
remarked the "shortness of the time remaining makes it doubtful
whether action could, or would, be taken in time to secure for
petitioners the effective relief they seek."'65
Consider also Frankfurter's Colegrove opinion, in which he
expresses a similar concern, if only slightly less subtly. Frankfurter
explains why the Court is unable to provide a remedy for
malapportionment. In his opinion, federal courts cannot redistrict the
whole state, for that would be out of the question.' The best that the
Court could do would be to provide injunctive relief and declare the
existing apportionment unconstitutional.67 "The result would be to
leave Illinois undistricted and to bring into operation, if the Illinois
legislature chose not to act, the choice of members for the House of
Representatives on a state-wide ticket."'
The problem with this
60. 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 564 (1945) (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Id (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Id at 564-65 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Id. at 565 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
Id. (Rutledge, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
Id. at 553.
Id.
Id.
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remedy is that "[a]ssuming acquiescence on the part of the authorities
of Illinois in the selection of its Representatives by a mode that defies
the direction of Congress for selection by districts, the House of
Representatives may not acquiesce."69

This concern with the acquiescence of the political branches to a
judicially imposed remedy for malapportionment leads one to ask
whether the Court had reason to believe that state and federal
officials might not acquiesce to an order purporting to compel a
reapportionment. The available evidence supports the contention
that the Court did have a reason to think about the possibility of noncompliance.70 Writing soon after the Court decided Baker, C.
Herman Pritchett, then-president of the American Political Science
Association, maintained that "Justice Harlan's [and Justice
Frankfurter's] reservations about judicial leadership have some
relevance ...[because] [c]ourts cannot lead unless some one will

follow."71 He went on to remark that the "Supreme Court, needing
legislative support, must anticipate the possibility that this support
may be less than complete." 72 Moreover, as he noted:
Many proposals for constitutional amendments have been
put forward to modify in one respect or another the impact
of the Supreme Court decisions on state legislatures. The
principal proposal, backed by the Republican Party platform
in 1964 and the Republican leadership in Congress, would
accept the position that one house must be based on
population, but would allow representation in the second
house to take into account factors other than population if
the people of the state approved in a referendum vote. 73

69. Id. ("In the exercise of its power to judge the qualifications of its own members,
the House may reject a delegation of Representatives-at-large.").
70. RiCHARD C. CORTNER, THE APPORTIONMENT CASES 146 (1970) ("The Court
was entering a field where ...the possibilities of resistance, if not defiance, from state
legislators were great."); ROBERT B. MCKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT:

THE LAW AND

POLrICs OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION 75 (1965) (stating that Frankfurter "feared that
any decision in this area would be unenforceable because unpopular"); Emerson, supra
note 59, at 75-76 ("The greatest danger facing the courts in dealing with the question of
remedies has been that legislative or executive officials would refuse to comply with
remedial decrees.").
71. C. Herman Pritchett, Equal Protectionand the Urban Majority, 58 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 869,875 (1964).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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2. Historical Context
As Justices Rutledge and Frankfurter intimated, state legislators,
who have the most to lose from the Court's involvement in this area,
had an incentive to resist any orders from the federal courts that were
contrary to their vested interests. Also, as a matter of historical
context, the Court decided Baker less than ten years after its
extremely divisive decision in Brown v. Board of Education,74 which
established the principle that state-sponsored racial segregation
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.75 As many commentators have
noted, Brown generated a considerable amount of resistance and
backlash.76 Without question Brown was one of the Court's most
controversial decisions. 77
Some members of the Court were
concerned with the possibility of non-compliance with a
reapportionment order in light of the unpopularity of the Court's
desegregation orders and attendant rampant disobedience from state
actors.78
Notwithstanding the controversiality of the school desegregation
cases, one must also account for the Court's subsequent need to
defend its authority, in Cooper v. Aaron,79 to compel compliance with
Brown's equality principle. 0 Cooper came before the Supreme Court
after state officials in Arkansas refused to comply with Brown.8 1 The
Cooper Court understood the refusal to abide by Brown as an

74. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
75. Id. at 493-95.
76. See also DAVID J. ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
THE LAw 19 (1995) (stating that "within fifteen years the controversy became
nationwide"); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REv. 1, 31-35 (1959) (discussing some of the problems with the Supreme
Court's legal reasoning in Brown); see generally LUCAS A. POWvE, JR., THE WARREN
COURT & AMERICAN POLITICS 37-39 (2000) (discussing the South's opposition to the
Brown decision); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING
ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 74-93 (1995) (discussing the political hostility toward the
Court after Brown).
77. See sources cited supra note 76.
78. See Mark Tushnet, Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The
Transformation and Disappearanceof the Political Question Doctrine, 80 N.C. L. REV.
1203, 1231-32 (2002); see also sources cited supranote 70.
79. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
80. It is worth noting the proximity between the two decisions. Baker was first argued
four terms after the Court handed down the decision in Cooper and decided one term
after that.
81. Cooper,358 U.S. at 4; see also Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Courtand the Rule
of Law: Cooper v. Aaron Revisited, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 387, 390-96 (discussing the
events leading to the Court's decision in Cooper).
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important and institution-defining challenge to its power. The Court
stated:
As this case reaches us it raises questions of the highest
importance to the maintenance of our federal system of
government. It necessarily involves a claim by the Governor
and Legislature of a State that there is no duty on state
officials to obey federal court orders resting on this Court's
considered
interpretation
of the United States
Constitution.... We are urged to uphold a suspension of
the Little Rock School Board's plan to do away with
segregated public schools in Little Rock until state laws and
efforts to upset and nullify our holding in Brown v. Board of
Education have been further challenged and tested in the
courts.82
In an opinion signed by all of the Justices, 3 the Court emphatically
rejected the State's argument, holding unequivocally that Brown
governed state officials in Arkansas.
Cooper is useful for two reasons. First, the opinion is not simply
a reaffirmation of Brown, but also an ardent reaffirmation of federal,
and by definition, judicial supremacy. In a portion of the opinion that
could arguably be classified as dictum, the Court felt the need to
"recall some basic constitutional propositions which are settled
doctrine." 4 The Court explained,
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the
"supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice
Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring to the
Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the
nation," declared in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison
that "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is." This decision
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and
that principle has ever since been respected by this Court
and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature
It follows that the
of our constitutional system.
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by
this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law of the land,
and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on
82. Cooper,358 U.S. at 4.
83. Id- Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion filed approximately a week
later. See Cooper,358 U.S. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Farber, supra note
81, at 401 ("Although Justice Frankfurter had wanted to write a separate opinion, he was
dissuaded from announcing it the same day as the main opinion.").
84. Cooper,358 U.S. at 17.
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the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
Every state
legislator and executive and judicial officer is solemnly
committed by oath taken pursuant to Art. VI, cl. 3, "to
support this Constitution." ...

No state legislator or

executive or judicial officer can war against the Constitution
without violating his undertaking to support it.85
These assertions of judicial supremacy--"supreme," "permanent,"
and "indispensable"--have been profoundly criticized.86 Irrespective
of the merits of the criticisms, the fact that the Court felt the need to
assert its supremacy in such strident terms reflects the intractability
and recalcitrance of the challenge faced by the Court: the absolute
refusal by certain state officials to abide by the Court's opinions. 87
Cooper is instructive for a second reason-the fact that it was
Frankfurter who felt the need to pen a separate concurrence. Due to
the importance of the issue presented-a challenge to the rule of law
and the Court's supremacy-Chief Justice Warren wanted a
unanimous opinion signed by all of the Justices." Justice Frankfurter,
however, insisted on writing a concurrence, a fact that provoked some
consternation with the other Justices, particularly Justices Brennan
and Black.89 Justice Frankfurter ultimately decided to write his
concurrence, but delay its announcement.
Professor Farber describes Justice Frankfurter's concurrence "as
an appeal to 'Southern lawyers and law professors.' "I Frankfurter
may have understood the need to appeal to state and local officials in
the South because he saw them as the enforcement arm of the
Court. 91 The indispensability of state and local officials and elites in
the South to the Court's authority is revealed toward the end in his
separate opinion. As Frankfurter notes:
[t]hat the responsibility of those who exercise power in a
democratic government is not to reflect inflamed public
feeling but to help form its understanding, is especially true
when they are confronted with a problem like a racially
85. Cooper,358 U.S. at 18 (citations omitted).
86. Farber, supra note 81, at 388-89, 403 (listing criticisms of assertions of judicial
supremacy).
87. Id at 400-01.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 401.
90. Id. (quoting Letter from Justice Frankfurter to C.C. Burlingham (Nov. 12, 1958),
reprintedin Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and Desegregation: Decisionmakingin the
Supreme Court,1948-1958,68 GEO. L. 1, 84 (1979)).
91. Farber, supra note 81, at 401.
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discriminating public school system. This is the lesson to be
drawn from the heartening experience in ending enforced
racial segregation in the public schools in cities with Negro
populations of large proportions. Compliance with decisions
of this Court, as the constitutional organ of the supreme
Law of the Land, has often, throughout our history,
depended on active support by state and local authorities. It
presupposes such support. To withhold it, and indeed to use
political power to try to paralyze the supreme Law,
precludes the maintenance of our federal system as we have
known and cherished it for one hundred and seventy years. 2
Thus, for Frankfurter, state and local officials (in addition to
federal officials) are necessary partners in the establishment and
enforcement of the rule of law as well as in the maintenance of the
Court's supremacy. As the history of that era reveals, the Court's
authority was being challenged by many institutional players-by
Congress, by the States, by local officials, and by academicsdissatisfied with the Court's decisions on school desegregation and
individual rights. With Baker, the Court was on the cusp of creating
more controversy, which raised the specter of additional rebellion by
state and local officials who had the most to lose from
reapportionment. Consequently, it is understandable that the Court
would be concerned-a concern best articulated by Frankfurter and
Harlan-that state legislatures and Congress might not comply with
an order from the Court purporting to compel a reapportionment.
One could argue, as did Justice Douglas in his concurrence in
Baker, that the Court need not worry about the refusal of states to
comply with a judicial command of substantial population equality
because states will comply if the Court shows that it is serious about
supervising the political process. 93 But Frankfurter saves perhaps his
most vituperative reprove for this line of reasoning. "This is not only
a euphoric hope," he exclaims:
It implies a sorry confession of judicial impotence in place of
a frank acknowledgement that there is not under our
Constitution a judicial remedy for every political mischief,
for every undesirable exercise of legislative power. The
Framers carefully and with deliberate forethoughts refused
so to enthrone the judiciary. In this situation, as in others of
like nature, appeal for relief does not belong here. Appeal
must be to an informed, civically militant electorate. In a
92. Cooper,358 U.S. at 26 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
93. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,248,250 & n.5 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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democratic society like ours, relief must come through an
aroused popular conscience that sears the conscience of the
people's representatives. In any event there is nothing
judicially more unseemly nor more self-defeating than for
this Court to make in terrorem pronouncements, to indulge
in merely empty rhetoric, sounding a word of promise to the
ear, sure to be disappointing to the hope.94

From Frankfurter's perspective, the Court is too enamored by
the "judicial Power." 95 The Court needs to appreciate that it cannot
resolve every evil, no matter how grave.96 Moreover, if the Court
does not come to terms with its institutional impotence in certain
matters and attempts to resolve every conflict, it "may well impair...

[its] position as the ultimate organ of 'the supreme Law of the Land'
in that vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in
popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce." 97 In other
words, because the Court cannot do everything, it must prioritize-by

adjudicating cases that are at the core of its raison d'etre-and choose
its battles carefully.

s

94. IL at 269-70 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
95. Id at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
96. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 554 (1946) (explaining that the judiciary
cannot correct all "grave evils").
97. Baker,369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
98. As it turned out the relationship between Brown-school desegregation-and
Baker-reapportionment-was not as surmised by the Court. In contrast to Brown and
the desegregation cases, Baker and the Court's reapportionment cases were enormously
popular with the electorate. No less a critic of the post-Baker line of reapportionment
cases than Alexander Bickel conceded as much. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLITICS
AND THE WARREN COURT 196 (1965) [hereinafter BICKEL, POLITICS] ("The Court's
rulings on apportionment have been popular."); see also Schuck, supra note 27, at 1380
("Perhaps nowhere has the Court's political success been more complete than in the area
of legislative reapportionment."); MCKAY, supra note 70, at 75-6, 218-20 (1965). In
addition, the reapportionment cases did not suffer from the types of enforcement
problems that accompanied the segregation cases. See id at 219-20 ("Not merely was
judicial and legislative foot-dragging conspicuously not the typical reaction; significantly, a
number of the courts and legislatures showed remarkable good faith in calling for
compliance both more prompt and more complete than the Supreme Court would
necessarily have required.").
Discovering why Baker and its progeny were successful and why Brown and its
progeny were met with limited success if at all is well beyond the scope of this Article.
One can argue, as did Professor Bickel, that in the reapportionment cases the Court could
appeal both to populist impulse and the unassailable goal of promoting greater
democracy. Bickel explains:
[The reapportionment cases] seem-and emerge from newspaper reportssimple, straightforward, obviously just. They favor majority control, and there is
hardly a strain of opinion in American political life which does not think that it
represents or can represent a majority. Hence the Court's rulings seem to offer
large promises of success to everyone, urban Democrats and suburban
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C. InstitutionalIncompetence

Related to Frankfurter's concern with judicial impotence-that
the Court cannot resolve every political and constitutional wrong
because the Court depends upon federal and state officials as well as
the goodwill of the populace to comply with its decrees-is a concern
with judicial incompetence. Though the federal courts may properly
adjudicate a matter and the courts' resolution may compel the

obeisance of the populace, the courts may not be able to devise a
proper solution. Deciding whether federal courts are to be involved
in the political process is not simply a matter of determining whether
the matter has been committed to the courts by the text and/or
practice of the Constitution, or whether the electorate and political

actors will comply with a judicial decree. The decision also entails a
conclusion that the federal courts have the institutional competence

to provide a remedy prescribed by the Constitution.
This

concern

with

institutional

Frankfurter's concern with standards.

competence

underlies

Frankfurter's contention is

that federal courts should not supervise the political process-even to

correct admittedly egregious instances of malapportionment99
because "standards meet for judicial judgment are lacking."

Frankfurter's criticism of Baker on the grounds that judicially
manageable standards are unavailable has received perhaps more
attention than his other criticisms of the majority's decision. Some
Republicans, supporters of medicare and opponents of open housing, and so
forth and so on. It is as if the Court had pronounced a piety no more
controversial than the common appeal to bring out the vote on election day.
BICKEL, POLITICS, supra, at 196. Moreover, as Professor Kurland notes, by the time of
Baker v. Carr, state legislatures had become relatively irrelevant-if costly-parts of
American government. PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
WARREN COURT 83-84 (1970). One can also argue, as does Professor Schuck, that in
Baker and its progeny the Court challenged the self-interest of politicians. See Schuck,
supra note 27, at 1331. At least in Brown, state actors who disagreed with the Court's
desegregation decisions could appeal to their constituents by utilizing counter-principles:
state's rights to name one prominent example. See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7, 98 (1994) ("Brown converted
race into the decisive focus of southern politics, and massive resistance became its
dominant theme."). In Baker, they had nothing to appeal to. Finally, one could argue, as
does Professor Klarman that judicial decisions do not stray far from public opinion. See
Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881,883
(1998) ("That the Court's constitutional interpretations reflect broad shifts in public
opinion seems difficult to deny."); see also Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights
and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996). In Baker, the Court tapped into
a strong national sentiment. In Brown however, the Court tapped into an emergent
national sentiment. I am grateful to Phil Frickey for helping me to think about the
relationship between Brown and Baker as it applies to my project in this Article.
99. Baker, 369 U.S. at 289 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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commentators have concluded that the primary dispute between
Frankfurter and the majority in Baker and between the respective
majorities in Colegrove and Baker "largely boiled down to a dispute
over the manageability of a constitutional standard for evaluating
apportionment systems."' 1 On this reading, Frankfurter's complaint
is that manageable standards are completely absent.
The absence of manageability is one way to understand
However, such an
Frankfurter's concern with standards.
questions. After
and
puzzling
understanding raises some interesting
all, manageable standards were in fact available. As Professor
Fuentes-Rohwer has argued in his contribution to this Symposium,
substantial equality is a standard. 10 1 Moreover, as he shows
convincingly, lower courts were able to apply standards in the wake of
the Court's decision in Baker.' 2 Finally, the standard of "one person,
one vote" and the concept of absolute equality did not spring ex
nihilo in Wesberry v. Sanders'0 3 and Reynolds v. Sims.' 4 Thus, the

one-person, one-vote standard was available and it was
administrable. 05
While Frankfurter's criticism with respect to the availability of
manageable standards is his most perceptive criticism of Baker and
justifiably worthy of attention, there is a different manner of thinking
about Frankfurter's concern with standards. First, it is important to
locate Frankfurter's complaint with the availability of manageable
standards within the context of his greater argument regarding the

100. ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 21, at 159 (emphasis added).
101. Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 14, at 1366-68.
102. Id at 1360 ("[I]t is clear lower courts were able to decide redistricting questions
effectively after Baker, thus suggesting that future redistricting cases could be decided in a
manner that preserves court review while limiting court interference to the most serious
cases.").
103. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
104. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
105. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

120-21 (1980). As Professor Ely stated:
Justice Frankfurter used to say that reapportionment was a "political thicket"
that the courts should avoid. The critics love to quote him, but in truth the
meaning of the point is blurred. Sometimes it has meant that there can be no
administrable standard for determining the legality of apportionments. At least
in the present context of this dispute, however, that is nothing short of silly. For
the very standard the Court chose in the landmark Reynolds v. Sims (the very
standard that was anathema to Frankfurter and his successor in criticism here,
Justice Harlan)-the "one person, one vote" standard-is certainly
administrable. In fact administrability is its long suit, and the more troublesome
question is what else it has to recommend it.
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proper role of the judiciary. Recall that Frankfurter's basic and
fundamental contention is that the federal courts should not involve
themselves in "the politics of the people," unless they are doing so
pursuant to a specific constitutional mandate. 1°6 Second, it is
important to note that Frankfurter is not simply concerned with the
availability of standards to evaluate apportionment systems, but
"standards meet for judicial judgment."' 7 As a point of departure, I
understand this phrase to mean that standards are available, though
they may not be "meet for judicial judgment."
The question then must be what Frankfurter means by the
phrase "meet for judicial judgment."
For Frankfurter,
reapportionment is not "meet for judicial judgment" because of the
inherent political nature of reapportionment disputes. One can begin
to get some purchase on this question by returning to Frankfurter's
political question objection. Frankfurter's chief complaint with
respect to judicial involvement in democratic politics is that
democratic politics is inherently political. In Colegrove, Frankfurter
provides:
We are of the opinion that the appellants ask of this Court
what is beyond its competence to grant. This is one of those
demands on judicial power which cannot be met by verbal
fencing about "jurisdiction."
It must be resolved by
considerations on the basis of which this Court, from time to
time, has refused to intervene in controversies. It has
refused to do so because due regard for the effective
working of our Government revealed this issue to be of a
peculiarly political nature and therefore not meet for judicial
determination. 0 8
This quote from Frankfurter in Colegrove provides an important
clue; issues that are political in nature are not "meet for judicial
determination."
Frankfurter provides a further clue in Baker. He maintains:
[Federal courts] do not have accepted legal standards or
criteria or even reliable analogies to draw upon for making
judicial judgments. To charge courts with the task of
accommodating the incommensurable factors of policy that
underlie these mathematical puzzles is to attribute, however,
flatteringly, omnicompetence to judges.' 9
106.
107.
108.
109.

See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,289 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Id.(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,552 (1946).
Baker, 369 U.S. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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The question was not whether judicially manageable standards
were available; they were. 110 Instead, the question was whether the
Court could defend, on doctrinal grounds, a choice between those
standards-no equality, substantial equality, and absolute equality in
reapportionment-given other legitimate factors."' For Frankfurter,
federal courts are to decide cases on the basis of "judicial standards
for judgment" as opposed to "policy making" or "legislative
determinations."" 2
Judicial standards for judgment are judicial
outcomes that are determined by the constitutional text and structure.
Policy or legislative determinations are judicial outcomes that cannot
be traced to the text or structure of the Constitution." 3
Thus, reapportionment does not provide standards meet for
judicial judgment because the issues presented in reapportionment
cases are inherently political."4 So far, so good, but additional
questions remain. For example, why should courts not adjudicate
political disputes? What is it about political disputes that renders
them unfit for judicial determination? Frankfurter provides some
interesting answers.
The first answer is that we cannot trust the judiciary to be
impartial when it adjudicates political contests. Frankfurter initially
tips his hand when he pens in Baker that the judiciary should not be
adjudicating these cases, "[e]ven assuming the indispensable
intellectual disinterestedness on the part of judges in such matters
.
115
"....
Frankfurter's citation of an excerpt from a House

110. ELY, supra note 105, at 121.

111. Frankfurter maintains:
From its earliest opinions this Court has consistently recognized a class of
controversies which do not lend themselves to judicial standards and judicial
remedies....
... A controlling factor in such cases is that, decision respecting these kinds of
complex matters of policy being traditionally committed not to courts but to the
political agencies of government for determination by criteria of political
expediency, there exists no standard ascertainable by settled judicial experience
or process by reference to which a political decision affecting the question at
issue between the parties can be judged.
Baker,369 U.S. at 280,282 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 277 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
113. This criticism became particularly relevant when the Court moved from the
substantial equality standard of Baker to the absolute equality standard of Kirkpatrick v.

Preisler,394 U.S. 526, 530-31 (1969); see also Samuel Issacharoff, Judging Politics: The
Elusive Quest for JudicialReview of PoliticalFairness, 71 TuX. L. REV. 1643, 1649-51

(1993).
114. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) ("It is hostile to a democratic
system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.").
115. Baker, 369 U.S. at 268 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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subcommittee hearing on reapportionment elucidates his
apprehension of judicial impartiality. This passage is quoted in
support of the proposition that "[a]pportionment battles are
overwhelmingly party or intra-party contests. It will add a virulent
source of friction and tension in federal-state relations to embroil the
federal judiciary in them.11 6 In support of these propositions, he
quotes:
Mr. Kasem. You do not think that [a provision embodying
the language: "in as compact form as practicable"] might
result in a decision depending upon the political inclinations
of the judge?
Mr. Celler. Are you impugning the integrity of our Federal
judiciary?
Mr. Kasem. No; I just recognize their human frailties." 7
Frankfurter also provides a second and related answer. Though
federal courts in fact may be impartial, they may be perceived as being
partial. The perception of partiality is particularly acute in this
context because reapportionment battles determine clear political
winners and losers. Were the Court to involve itself in these battles,
federal judges and not the political process would be picking the
winners and losers. As Frankfurter states, "[n]othing is clearer than
that this controversy concerns matters that bring courts into
immediate and active relations with party contests."" 8 He concludes:
Unless judges, the judges of this Court, are to make their
private views of political wisdom the measure of the
Constitution-views which in all honesty cannot but give the
appearance, if not reflect the reality, of involvement in the
business of partisan politics so inescapably a part of
apportionment controversies-the Fourteenth Amendment
... provides

no guide for judicial

oversight of the

representation problem. 19
The problem for Frankfurter was not the unavailability of standards
"that might be used in determining the validity of an apportionment
scheme,"' 2° but that the federal courts can only be guided in their
116. I& at 324 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
117. Id.at 325-26 & n.148 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
118. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 549; id. at 554 ("The one stark fact that emerges from a
study of the history of Congressional apportionment is its embroilment in politics, in the
sense of party contests and party interests.").
119. Baker,369 U.S. at 301-02 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
120. Jerold Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The
Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 MICH. L. REv. 107,108 (1962).
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choice of evaluative standards-given that the Constitution did not
provide any guidance-on the basis of their political preferences and
political philosophies. When the Constitution does not provide any
guidance for discriminating between one standard or another, "courts
are not fit instruments of decision where what is essentially at stake is
the composition of those large contests of policy traditionally fought
out in non-judicial forums, by which governments and the actions of
governments are made and unmade."'"
Moreover, for Frankfurter, federal courts could not make these
choices unless they were willing to choose one political theory over
another. 123 "What is actually asked of the Court in this case," he
exclaims, "is to choose among competing bases of representationultimately, really, among competing theories of political philosophyin order to establish an appropriate frame of government for the
124
State of Tennessee and thereby for all the States of the Union.
Given the stakes of judicial determination, clashing views about
political theory are themselves a crucial part of politics.'2 As he
emphasized in Baker, "tradition had long entrusted questions"
regarding the very structure or form of government "to non-judicial
processes.' 2 6 Frankfurter underscores the point that deciding
reapportionment disputes is tantamount to dictating political
influence and political power among competing groups on the basis of
the judge's political theory. 27 For example, consider the choice
between at-large elections as opposed to districted elections. The
decision between the two "is a matter of sweeping political judgment
having enormous political implications."'" Again, the problem is that
the Constitution does not dictate the outcome in these cases; there
121. Michael W. McConnell, The Redistricting Cases: OriginalMistakes and Current
Consequences, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 106 (2000) ("At the time of Baker, the
Equal Protection Clause had never been applied to the districting question, and there were
any number of possible interpretations,with no judicially manageable means of choosing
among them.") (emphasis added).
122. Baker,369 U.S. at 287 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
123. For a contemporary version of this argument, see Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
891, 901-02 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The matters the Court has set out to resolve
in vote dilution cases are questions of political philosophy, not questions of law. As such,
they are not readily subjected to any judicially manageable standards.").
124. Baker,369 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
125. See also Holder, 512 U.S. at 903 (Thomas, J., concurring) (intimating that
questions of political theory are political matters that are part of politics not adjudication).
126. Baker, 369 U.S. at 295 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). I thank Dan Farber for
pointing out this observation.
127. Id. at 299 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("No shift of power but works as a
corresponding shift in political influence among the groups composing a society.").
128. Id. at 328 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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are not any standards meet for judicial judgment.129 The results can
only be explained by reference to the federal courts' partisanship,
political philosophy, or preference for certain political groups.
D. JudicialLegitimacy

From this vantage point, we can begin to appreciate what is
really at stake for Frankfurter in this debate. What happens if the
federal courts, in the absence of adequate constitutional guidance,
endeavor to decide political disputes on the basis of whims, individual

preferences, partisanship, and political theory? The inevitable
consequence of such decisionmaking is that the electorate and
political elites-whose cooperation is necessary to carry out the
Court's commands-will have less faith in the judicial decisionmaking
process. Therein lies Frankfurter's real concern.
For Frankfurter, judicial legitimacy is achieved by deciding cases

in accordance with the constitutional text. However, judicial
legitimacy is not an end in and of itself. Judicial legitimacy is
instrumental to facilitating the core function of the judiciary. 130 As

Professor Schotland eloquently maintains, "if judicial review of
districting suffers standardless subjectivity, there is danger that
subjectivity degenerates to partisan preference; and if the courts are

in fact or are justifiably seen as partisan, then their ability to perform
their highest role is endangered."13 '
Professor Schotland's
observation finds much support in the following statement from
Frankfurter in Baker:

129. This is precisely how Alexander Bickel understood and justified the Court's
refusal to intervene in Colgrove. Bickel explained:
Colegrove is not a standing case, and it does not hold on principle that, like
recognition of foreign governments, legislative apportionment must be
unprincipled. Nor was the decisive factor the difficulty or uncertainty that might
attend enforcement of a decree ....The point of Colgrove is that even aside
from such exceptions as are fixed by the constitutional scheme itself, the political
institutions have consistently found it necessary to modify the principle of
equality of representation, which is the goal established under the fifteenth and
fourteenth amendments. It has been found necessary to represent not only
people, but interests. The Court felt unable to deny this necessity, or-without
probing motives--to construct a principle that might accommodate it.
Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term Forward.- The Passive Virtues, 75
HARV.L. REV. 40,78 (1961).
130. Yoo, supra note 27, at 782 ("In other words, only by acting in a manner that
suggests that its decisions are the product of law rather than politics can the Court
maintain its legitimacy.").
131. Roy A. Schotland, The Limits of Being "Presentat the Creation," 80 N.C. L. Rev.
1505, 1515 (2002).
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Disregard of inherent limits in the effective exercise of the
Court's "judicial Power" not only presages the futility of
judicial intervention in the essentially political conflict of
forces by which the relation between population and
representation has time out of mind been and now is
determined. It may well impair the Court's position as the
ultimate organ of "the supreme Law of the Land" in that the
vast range of legal problems, often strongly entangled in
popular feeling, on which this Court must pronounce. The
Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the
sword-ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its
moral sanction. Such feeling must be nourished by the
Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance,
from political entanglements and by abstention from
injecting itself into the clash of political forces in political
settlements.

One cannot help but wonder whether Frankfurter was reminding
the Court of its then-recent experience in the school desegregation or
132. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Frankfurter's argument has a
contemporary analogue in Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833
(1992) (plurality opinion). Given the similarities, it is worth quoting the passage at length:
The root of American governmental power is revealed most clearly in the
instance of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the Judiciary of the
United States and specifically upon this Court. As Americans of each succeeding
generation are rightly told, the Court cannot buy support for its decisions by
spending money and, except to a minor degree, it cannot independently coerce
obedience to its decrees. The Court's power lies, rather, in its legitimacy, a
product of substance and perception that shows itself in the people's acceptance
of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation's law means and to declare
what it demands.
The underlying substance of this legitimacy is of course the warrant for the
Court's decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on
which the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court's opinions, and
our contemporary understanding is such that a decision without principled
justification would be no judicial act at all. But even when justification is
furnished by apposite legal principle, something more is required. Because not
every conscientious claim of principled justification will be accepted as such, the
justification claimed must be beyond dispute. The Court must take care to speak
and act in ways that allow people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court
claims for them, as grounded truly in principle, not as compromises with social
and political pressures having, as such, no bearing on the principled choices that
the Court is obliged to make. Thus, the Court's legitimacy depends on making
legally principled decisions under circumstances in which their principled
character is sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 865-66 (plurality opinion); see also Robert G. McCloskey, Foreword:
The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REV. 54, 67 (1962) ("If the public should ever
become convinced that the Court is merely another legislature, that judicial review is only
a euphemism for an additional layer in the legislative process, the Court's future as a
constitutional tribunal would be cast in grave doubt.").
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Perhaps Frankfurter was of the opinion, as

were many social scientists in his day, that compliance with the
decisions of the Supreme Court depended in part upon one's belief
that the Court's pronouncements represented the supreme law of the

land. As Professor Farber explains, though they disagreed with the
decision, many southern moderates were prepared to abide by Brown
on the grounds that Brown was law, which implies the necessary
predicate that the Supreme Court has the power to declare the law."3

Thus, Frankfurter cannot be faulted for arguing that inasmuch as
the Court must continually decide necessarily controversial cases that
are at the core of its purpose, and to the extent that the Court

depends upon the cooperation of others to carry out its
pronouncements, the Court cannot afford to be partial or be
perceived as being partial. The Court's decisions must follow from
the Constitution's text, history, or structure. The Court cannot afford
to squander its legitimacy.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM: A THEORY OF INTERPRETATION

A.

TheoreticalExposition

For Frankfurter, the confluence of these concerns-institutional
boundaries, institutional impotence, institutional competence, and
judicial legitimacy-led to the conclusion that the Court should make
use of its avoidance theories and refrain from involving itself in the
supervision of democratic politics. These are powerful arguments and
they necessitate a response. Of his four concerns, Frankfurter
displayed a notable lack of prescience in predicting that judicial
involvement in the political process would undermine judicial
legitimacy. 135 In addition, as indicated by the response of state
133. Tushnet, supra note 78, at 1231 (explaining that Frankfurter's admonitions against
judicial involvement in Baker were premised upon Frankfurter's worry that judicial
involvement might jeopardize the Court's ability to bring about racial justice).
134. Farber, supra note 81, at 390-96 ("Influential persons supported desegregation
even though they disagreed with it, precisely because they believed in the 'fictions of
Marbury.' ").
135. ELY, supra note 105, at 121; Louis L. Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist? The Search
for Intermediate Premises, 80 HARV. L. REv. 986, 991 (1967) ("At least some of us who
shook our heads over Baker v. Carrare prepared to admit that it has not been futile, that
it has not impaired, indeed that is has enhanced, the prestige of the Court."). Thus, Justice
Clark proved prophetic when he stated that "[n]ational respect for the courts is more
enhanced through the forthright enforcement of [constitutional] rights rather than by
rendering them nugatory through the interposition of subterfuges. In my view the
ultimate decision today is in the greatest tradition of this Court." Baker, 369 U.S. at 262
(Clark, J., concurring).
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officials to Baker, Frankfurter was unnecessarily troubled that state
actors might refuse to comply with an order from the Court requiring
apportionment. 6 Frankfurter's most perceptive criticism of Baker
and its inevitable progeny was that the federal courts would be at sea
in distinguishing between consequential policy determinations
because the Constitution does not provide any guidance to the courts
as they attempt to adjudicate disputes generated by the "clash of
political forces in political settlements." 37
Though one may grant the validity of this concern, it does not
follow that judicial regulation of the democratic process is
unwarranted. While the Court's involvement in the democratic
process is not always welcome, most agree that it is necessary."' In
any event, though we continue to question judicial review of matters
political,139 we no longer question judicial involvement in the political
process simply as a matter of principle.140 There is too much at stake
in democratic politics to completely trust the discretion of state
actors, political majorities, or political minorities. 4'
Baker provides a prime example of the need for judicial
supervision of politics. The extent of the malapportionment at issue
in Baker violated some of our most basic understandings of
representative democracy. As a consequence of Tennessee's failure
to reapportion for approximately sixty years, a minority of its citizens
controlled access to the political process. Moreover, Tennessee's
elected officials, to the extent that they were responsive and
accountable, were only accountable and responsive to the needs of a
minority of Tennessee voters. Given the significance of the issues at
stake, it is unsurprising that talismanic and formalistic incantations of
justiciability ultimately gave way to substantial questions of
democratic legitimacy.
Thus, while Justice Frankfurter may have been correct on some
grounds-in particular on his insistence that the Constitution does
not provide the judiciary with sufficient guidance to enable the Court
to meaningfully and predictably supervise the political process-he
was certainly wrong when he argued that the judiciary should blind
136. POWE, supra note 76, at 203.
137. Baker, 369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
138. See, e.g., Michael C. Doff & Samuel Issacharoff, Can Process Theory Constrain
Courts?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 925 (2001) (stating that "judicial review of politics
seems a necessity").
139. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), is a prime example here.
140. Doff & Issacharoff, supra note 138, at 933 (stating that Bush v. Gore should not
"prompt a reconsideration" ofjudicial involvement in politics).
141. Samuel Issacharoff, PoliticalJudgments, 68 U. CH.L. RaV. 637,653-54 (2001).
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itself to the multitudinous inequalities present in the political process.
The structure of governmental institutions is not so complex and
political as to be well beyond the ken of the judiciary. Consequently,
the Baker majority was correct to engage the political process though
the Court's engagement was not guided by an apparent constitutional
or political theory.
Nevertheless, even if one concedes the necessity for judicial
involvement in politics, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan were
certainly right to demand a justification for judicial supervision of
electoral politics. As Justice Douglas acknowledged in his Baker
concurrence, federal courts are at a distinct disadvantage in
adjudicating democratic rights because the constitutional text is for
the most part unhelpful. As he noted, "[s]o far as voting rights are
concerned, there are large gaps in the Constitution."' 42 Given these
gaps, it is unclear what one should conclude from textual silences.4
One can reason, as Justice Frankfurter urged, that textual silences
at hand and
mean that the Constitution does not address the problem
44
concomitantly, the Court does not have a role to play.
Furthermore, when the text is not silent, it is often vague. 45 For
example, the Court has pervasively regulated democratic politics in
near-absolute reliance on the Equal Protection Clause. Yet, the
meaning of the phrase "equal protection of the laws" remains
uncertain in the context of democratic politics. Does it truly provide
a basis for addressing the problem of unequally weighted votes?
concurring).
142. Baker, 369 U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J.,
143. See Paul E. McGreal, There Is No Such Thing as Textualism: A Case Study in
Constitutional Method, 69 FORDHAM L. REv. 2393, 2418-23 (2001) (arguing that text
without another means of interpretation is useless); see also Boris I. Bitker, Interpreting
the Constitution, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, 9, 42 (1995) (discussing the historical
invocation of the noninterpretist approach by Supreme Court Justices); R. Randall Kelso,
Styles of Constitutional Interpretation, 29 VAL. U. L. REV.121, 138-49 (1994) (discussing
the validity of noninterpretive methods of approaching constitutional law).
144. See McGreal, supra note 143. In this vein, note the structure of Justice Douglas's
concurrence in Baker. Though he concedes that the Constitution is silent on most
questions of democratic rights, he points out that the Constitution speaks to some issues
regarding the availability of the franchise. The "right to vote is inherent in the republican
form of government envisaged by Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution." Baker, 369
U.S. at 242 (Douglas, J., concurring). In addition, though "the States may specify the
qualifications for voters" per Article I, Section 2, Clause I, the Constitution places specific
limits on the states including race and sex discrimination in voting. Id.at 243-44 (Douglas,
J.,
concurring). Finally, and perhaps more importantly, there "is a third barrier to a State's
freedom in prescribing qualifications of voters and that is the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment .... " Id. at 244 (Douglas, J., concurring). Consequently,
malapportionment is an issue that is addressed by the Constitution, if only implicitly.
145. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 16, at 651-52 (noting the shortcomings of the
constitutional text).
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What about hanging chads, butterfly ballots, or voting machines?
Similarly, consider special interest legislation: Do they violate
notions of constitutional equality?
In addition, as the debate spawned by Bush v. Gore has
demonstrated, though the Constitution may speak to a particular
question, it is sometimes uncertain whether the Court has a role to
play in resolving the dispute.146 This inquiry can morph into various
formulations, most of which fall under the categories of standing,
justiciability, and political questions: Is there a dispute? What is the
nature of the harm? Can the Court provide relief? 4 7 Are there
compelling reasons for judicial abstention on prudential grounds?
How explicit is the constitutional text? Has the matter been
committed by the text to another branch?
Given the necessity for at least some judicial supervision even in
the face of an unhelpful constitutional text, the fundamental question
is whether the Court can walk the tightrope between suitable
regulation of democratic politics and unjustified interference with the
legitimate outcomes of a properly functioning democratic process."4
This inquiry presupposes that the Court is able to distinguish between
proper and improper functions of the democratic process. The
inquiry also presupposes that is it possible to differentiate ex ante
between judicial involvement in the political process that one would
approve ex post from judicial involvement that one would find
intolerable. Whether there are ascertainable limitations to judicial
involvement in democratic politics depends in part on whether we can
distinguish a properly functioning democratic process from an
improperly functioning one.

146. The Article II, Twelfth Amendment arguments in Bush v. Gore are prime
examples. See Tushnet, supra note 78, at 1226 ("Much in the argument for the proposition
that the Article II issue presented a political question turns on what I call the atmospherics
of the Twelfth Amendment. Reading the Amendment, one certainly gets the general
impression that Congress was supposed to play a large, and perhaps the only, role in
resolving contested presidential elections. Certainly nothing in the Amendment refers
directly to a judicial role in resolving such elections.").
147. See id.
148. The struggle to find a satisfactory approach to judicial review of democratic
politics has its analogue in the field of statutory interpretation. For excellent overviews of
recent debates, see generally Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity:
Spirit, Letter, and History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 901 (2000)
(advocating the use of legislative history when construing statutes); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001) (exploring the methods of
statutory interpretation in the ten years after the adoption of the Constitution).
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Frankfurter was right that the Constitution provides very little
guidance to the courts as they attempt to regulate democratic politics.
But he arrived at the wrong conclusion-that courts must abstain
from interfering with the political process in the absence of precise
constitutional guidance. The Court and the Constitution cannot be
agnostic regarding the aims and purposes of democratic politics.
Judicial involvement in the political process is sometimes necessary,
Frankfurter's admonitions notwithstanding, in order to vindicate the
important values that make possible democratic politics. Irrespective
of the necessity of judicial involvement, Frankfurter was correct that
the Court needs a theory that would guide its determination of when
to involve itself in the political process.
Willy-nilly judicial
interference in the political process undermines the proper
functioning of democratic politics and fails to recognize when the
149
political process is responding to legitimate democratic values.
One of Frankfurter's fundamental objections to the Court's
involvement in the political process is that the Constitution does not
150
provide any guidance to courts in resolving political disputes.
Indeed, as I have already mentioned and as some commentators have
noted, the Constitution is notably silent with respect to most aspects
of democratic politics.'
Additionally, as Frankfurter was keen to
point out, when the Constitution does address the content of
representative institutions in certain passages, those passages do not
seem to be directed at courts. They are open-textured and do not
contain any specific commands. 52 They appear to be instructions to
149. Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a
Changeable Court,in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE & THE SUPREME COURT 77, 80-81 (Cass
Sunstein & Richard Epstein eds., 2001).
150. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) ("The Constitution has many
commands that are not enforceable by courts because they clearly fall outside the
conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial action.").
151. As the authors of one of the leading casebooks in this area remark:
[Though] [t]he text does speak in quite general terms about the terms of federal
elected officials and even more generally about qualifications .... the
Constitution ... does not explicitly address most other important issues
regarding elections-from how ballots are to be cast, to the electoral system for
all public offices save the president and the Senate, to issues of how elections are
to be run and financed, and so forth.
ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 21, at 17; see also Luis Fuentes-Rohwer &
Guy-Uriel Charles, The Electoral College, The Right to Vote, and Our Federalism: A
Comment on a Lasting Institution, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 879, 915 (forthcoming 2002)
("Our contemporary understanding of democracy and the right to vote has indubitably
progressed beyond that of colonial times."), available at http://www.law.fsu.eduljournals/
lawreviev/dovnloads/292/FRCharles.pdf; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 16, at 712-16.
152. For Frankfurter, an apt contrast is state court constitutions. He maintains:
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other branches, the states, state legislatures, and Congress. 53
Consider as a prime example the Guarantee Clause, which provides
in part that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government. '' 1" Federal courts cannot
entertain challenges that a state government is not republican in
form. 55 As Frankfurter maintained, the "Constitution has many
commands that are not enforceable by courts because they clearly fall
outside the conditions and purposes that circumscribe judicial
action."' 156

Moreover, those aspects of democratic politics that are addressed
by the Constitution often reflect a different, if not anachronistic,
conception of democracy. 157 As Professor Levinson explains, the
Founders' vision of democracy reflected a world that
included elaborate theories of the male's duty to protect
vulnerable females or the ubiquity of public officials
sufficiently virtuous as to be wholly unmotivated by such
Decisions of state courts which have entertained apportionment cases under their
respective state constitutions do not, of course, involve the very considerations
relevant to federal judicial intervention.... [S]tate constitutions generally speak
with a specificity totally lacking in attempted utilization of the generalities of the
Fourteenth Amendment to apportionment matters. Some expressly commit
apportionment to state judicial review, see, e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1938, art. III, § 5,
and even where they do not, they do precisely fix the criteria for judicial
judgment respecting the allocation of representative strength within the
electorate.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 327 & n.150 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
153. Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine:
Reviving The Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1165, 1199

(2002).
154. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.

155. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556 (stating that "the fulfillment of this duty cannot be
judicially enforced"). For an argument that the Guarantee Clause should be justiciable,
see McConnell, supra note 121, at 106-07 ("[]f the Court were inclined to develop
judicially manageable standards under the Equal Protection Clause, it could do so equally
well under the Republican Form of Government Clause."); Deborah Jones Merritt,
Republican Governments and Autonomous States: A New Role for the GuaranteeClause,

65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815, 822-27 (1994); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalismfor a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 2 (1988)

("[A]lthough the Supreme Court has held claims based on the guarantee clause
nonjusticiable, the interpretation of the clause outlined [here] should be fully enforceable
in the courts.").
156. Colegrove, 328 U.S. at 556.
157. ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 21, at 17-19 ("With respect to
democratic politics, ... the American Constitution is a curious amalgam of textual
silences, archaic assumptions that subsequent developments quickly undermined, and a
small number of narrowly targeted more recent amendments that reflect more modern
conceptions of politics."); Issacharoff & Pildes,supra note 16, at 713, 714 (noting that "the
original Constitution reflected a particularly elite conception of democratic politics").
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crass interests as paying sufficient attention to the interests
of actual voters as would 158
allow the officials to be returned to
office in the next election.
The Court's attempt to reconcile the Founders' archaic and
crabbed understanding of political participation as enshrined in the
constitutional text with our contemporary and more progressive
vision results in two notions that are fundamentally at odds with one
another, but which are both well supported by the Court's voting
rights jurisprudence.
First, voting is a fundamental right of
democratic citizenship, 159 and second, voting in presidential elections

is only available when that right is provided by the states. 1' °
Thus, Frankfurter is clearly correct that the Constitution is
unhelpful in resolving most issues of democratic politics. The text
provides so little guidance in part because it is silent on most issues of
democratic politics and in part because its commands do not appear
to be directed to the federal courts. Moreover, to the extent that the
Constitution addresses the structure and content of democratic
institutions, the text often contradicts modern understandings. Thus,
the text more or less hinders the type of expansive and progressive
vision of political participation that the Court attempts to effect with
its reapportionment revolution.
The inutility of the text presents the federal courts with a
conundrum. Because the text is often unhelpful in resolving
democratic disputes, the temptation is for the courts to blind
themselves to fundamental problems in the democratic process.' 6' As
a further complication, once courts decide to enter the political
thicket, they are hard pressed to discover a guiding theory. This
conundrum presents a number of interesting inquiries. First, is there
a criterion for distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate
regulations of democratic politics? Put differently, can the Court
develop a theory, grounded in a substantive vision of what democracy
158. Sanford Levinson, One Person, One Vote: A Mantrain Need of Meaning, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 1269, 1291 (2002); see also ISSACHAROFF, KARLAN & PILDES, supra note 21, at
17 ("The failure of the Constitution to offer much specific guidance also reflects the
premodern world of democratic practice and the long-since rejected assumptions of that
world on which the Constitution rests.").
159. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of
suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic society.").
160. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98,103 (2000); Fuentes-Rohwer & Charles, supra note 151,
at 922.
161. See generally Pushaw, supra note 153. (arguing for a return to the Federalist
theory of "rebuttable presumption," which would reign in judicial review of cases
involving political questions).
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requires and tied to the constitutional text or structure, to guide its
supervision of the democratic process? Presumably, the purpose of
this theory would enable the Court to discriminate among legitimate
state policies that affect political rights from illegitimate ones.
Ideally, this theory would combine the constitutional text, with its
silences, and its vagueness-"Equal Protection," "Due Process,"
"Republican Form of Government," etc.-in addition to substantive
principles of democratic theory to address the ills or excesses of
democratic politics.
An additional query is whether Baker provides any answers to
this conundrum. Does the opinion reflect a theoretical justification
for the Court's holding that malapportioned districts are justiciable?
Moreover, can the Court's justification be generalized to cover most
instances of judicial review of democratic politics?
Baker can be understood as a case that circumscribes judicial
involvement in democratic politics to instances in which state actors
frustrate the purposes of democratic governance by abandoning any
one of the principles that provide legitimacy to the political process. I
term this approach constitutional pluralism. 162
Constitutional
pluralism is a theory regarding the application of constitutional
democratic principles to the function, purpose, and process of
democratic politics. These principles are derived from the vague
textual guidance provided by various passages in the Constitution and
from the dictates of democratic theory.1 63 My contention is not that
the Court self-consciously applied the theory of constitutional
pluralism as an interpretive guide in Baker. Rather, I contend that
constitutional pluralism provides a coherent framework for making

162. Constitutional pluralism can be classified as, in Professor Gerken's terms, a
"intermediary theory," which she defines as a mid-level theory, the purpose of which is to
"give shape and content" to abstract constitutional principles such as equality. See
Heather Gerken, The Costs and Causes of Minimalism: Baker v. Carr and Its Progeny, 80
N.C. L. REV. 1411, 1414 (2002). Constitutional pluralism can also be understood as an
intermediate premise, in Professor Jaffe's terms. See Jaffe, supra note 135, at 988-91.
Again, the function is similar; constitutional pluralism is a theory that mediates between
the open-textured provisions of the Constitution and the questions of democratic politics
that the Court must address.
163. My argument is not without a textual basis. I can claim both the Equal Protection
and Guarantee Clauses as providing the textual bases for the democratic principles
articulated in this Article. Consequently, I concede to Justice Frankfurter that the
Guarantee Clause is implicated when the judiciary reviews structural composition of
democratic institutions and agree with Professor McConnell, who advances a similar point.
See McConnell, supra note 121, at 105-06 (arguing that Guarantee Clause claims should
be justiciable).
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sense of Baker and for understanding the Court's role in democratic
politics.
Constitutional pluralism is neither absolutely distinct from nor
absolutely congruent with political process theory as articulated by
Justice Stone in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.,'" and popularized by Professor Ely in Democracy & Distrust.65
In the second paragraph of footnote 4 of Carolene Products,Justice
Stone intimated that more stringent judicial review might be
warranted of "legislation which restricts those political processes
which can ordinarily be expected to bring about real of undesirably
legislation."' 166 Justice Stone also suggested, in the third paragraph of
footnote four, that "more exacting" judicial scrutiny might be
warranted towards state action that is directed against "discrete and
insular minorities" because such action "tends seriously to curtail the
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities."' 167
6
Building on Carolene Products in Democracy & Distrust,"
Professor Ely advances two arguments in favor of judicial regulation
of democratic politics. First, he argues, "unblocking stoppages in the
democratic process is what judicial review ought preeminently to be
about."' 69 Second, Professor Ely explains judicial review can also be
justified if employed in the protection of "those who can't protect
7
themselves politically" as a consequence of unjustified prejudice.1 1
With respect to malapportioned districts, Professor Ely notes that
they are problems worthy of the Court's attention because "they
involve rights (1) that are essential to the democratic process and (2)
whose dimensions cannot safely be left to our elected
representatives,
''
who have obvious nested interest in the status quo. 7
Similarly, Professors Issacharoff and Pildes argue that judicial
supervision of democratic politics is warranted to prevent political

164. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 & n.4 (1938).
165. See ELY, supra note 105.
166. CaroleneProducts,304 U.S. at 152 & n.4.
167. Id. at 153 & n.4.
168. See supranote 105.
169. ELY, supra note 105, at 117 & ch. 5; see also Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling
Resistance to PoliticalProcessTheory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 784 (1991) (accord).
170. ELY, supranote 105, at 152-53; Klarman, supra note 169, at 784 (accord).
171. ELY, supra note 105, at 117; see also icL at 120 ("We cannot trust the ins to decide
who stays out, and it is therefore incumbent on the courts to ensure not only that no one is
denied the vote for no reason, but also that where there is a reason (and there will be) it
had better be a very convincing one.").
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actors from locking-up political institutions "to forestall
competition."172 They argue that:
[D]emocratic politics [should be viewed] as akin in
important respects to a robustly competitive market-a
market whose vitality depends on clear rules of engagement
and on the ritual cleansing born of competition. Only
through an appropriately competitive partisan environment
can one of the central goals of democratic politics be
realized: that the policy outcomes of the political process be
responsive to the interests and views of citizens. But politics
shares with all markets a vulnerability to anticompetitive
behavior. In political markets, anticompetitive entities alter
the rules of engagement to protected established powers
from the risk of successful challenge. This market analogy
may be pushed one step further if we view elected officials
and dominant parties as a managerial class, imperfectly
accountable through periodic review 1to
a diffuse body of
73
equity holders known as the electorate.
They "propose that a self-conscious judiciary should destabilize
political lockups in order to protect the competitive vitality of the
electoral process and facilitate more responsive representation." 174
I agree with Professors Ely, Issacharoff, and Pildes that the
Court's role in supervising the democratic process is to reinforce
fundamental principles of democratic politics. Consequently, the
approach outlined in this Article is consistent with and follows from
process theory. I also agree that an important principle of democratic
politics is to facilitate responsiveness by elected officials.17 5 The
approach outlined in this Article, however, moves the debate into
three distinctive directions. First, it is insufficient to agree that the
aim of judicial supervision of democratic politics is to reinforce
fundamental democratic principles or identify state action "which
restricts those political processes." 76
Judicial supervision of
democratic politics can only be fully justified by concretely identifying
the specific aims and purposes of democratic politics that are
frustrated by political actors but vindicated by judicial review.
Responsiveness as a justification for judicial review, as explained by
Professor Ely and convincingly defended by Professors Issacharoff
and Pildes, is but one of many aims of democratic politics. While I
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 16, at 646.
Id
Id.at 649.
I discuss this point infra notes 207-23.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144,152 & n.4 (1938).
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discuss several others in this Article, still others, such as political
association, can be identified.
The second distinctive contribution is related to the prejudice
prong of political process theory. The prejudice prong of process
theory, articulated in paragraph three of Carolene Products footnote
four, has served as a fundamental rationale for judicial review. 177 The
problem is that this rationale is increasingly untenable. As Professor
Karlan in particular has argued, the "Supreme Court deploys the
Equal Protection Clause not to protect the rights of an identifiable
group of individuals, particularly a group unable to protect itself
through the operation of the normal political processes, but rather to
regulate the institutional arrangements within which politics is
conducted. ' ' 17 8 Moreover, the Court "re-enlists equal protection in
'179
the service of less, rather than greater, equality and democracy.
Thus, citizens of color cannot count upon the courts to provide them
with greater political equality. Additionally, citizens of color may be
better off by relying upon their political power in the political process.
As Professor Spann has powerfully remarked, citizens of color are
better off in a pluralist word than they are in a world in which they
are dependent upon the judiciary.'
Similarly, Professor Klarman has
suggested, convincingly, that "complete black enfranchisement,
enforced energetically at all levels of government would alleviate the
need" for particular judicial consideration for African Americans. 8'
Moreover, one may persuasively argue that the Supreme Court itself
has explicitly rejected Carolene Products' contention that judicial
review should reflect special solicitude for discrete and insular groups,
particularly people of color.182
177. See ELY, supra note 105, at 105; see also Samuel Issacharoff, Groups and the Right
to Vote, 44 Emory LJ. 869, 872 (1995) ("The rationale of Carolene Products ... suggests
that a claim for judicial reform of the political process requires a showing both of group
disadvantage and of the group's historic inability to redress that disadvantage through the
normal working of the political process.").
178. Karlan, supra note 15, at 1345.
179. lad; see also Girardeau A. Spann, Pure Politics, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1971, 1971
(1990) ("The present Supreme Court has been noticeably unreceptive to legal claims
asserted by racial minorities.").
180. Spann, supra note 179, at 1995-2000.
181. Klarman, supra note 169, at 788-89.
182. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("Individuals who have been wronged by
unlawful racial discrimination should be made whole; but under our Constitution, there
can be no such thing as either a creditor or a debtor race .... In the eyes of government,
we are just one race here. It is American."); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 651 (1993)
("Indeed racial classifications receive close scrutiny even when they may be said to burden
the races equally."). One can view the Court's ultimate rejection of the prejudice prong as
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Given these observations, judicial review of democratic politics
cannot be justified on the grounds that the Court bears a special
responsibility to shield citizens of color from the vagaries of the
political process. How then should the Court respond when a
particular group is adversely impacted in the political process? This is
where constitutional pluralism's descriptive orientation comes into
play. The inquiry under constitutional pluralism's descriptive
orientation is whether the legislative act at issue is the product of
group conflict and accommodation of group interests or whether the
legislative act is a product of a closed and biased political process.
Where the political process is infected by systemic biases against the
group in question, the Court is justified in intervening in order to
facilitate a more open process. However, where the challenged
legislative act is the product of group conflict and group compromise,
judicial interference cannot be justified. Judicial review cannot be
justified where the effect of the Court's involvement is to deprive a
political group of its hard fought gains where those gains are the
product of political struggle and compromise.
Third, constitutional pluralism departs from political process
theory to the extent that constitutional pluralism accepts the limited
role that substantive values must play in the regulation of democratic
politics. Value choices are inevitable. Consequently, the debate
ought not be about whether substantive values must be enforced, but
rather what sorts of values are necessary to sustain a well-functioning
democratic process.
B.

ConstitutionalPluralism: Application to Baker
Representative democracy presupposes the existence of
underlying structures of representation and representative institutions
that are not at odds with the principles or aims of democratic politics.
State actors must give effect to these principles of democratic politics
through the design, structure, and implementation of democratic
politics. Key principles include: majority rule, political participation,
accountability, responsiveness, substantial equality, and interest
representation. 8 3 These are concepts that are foundational to
democratic politics because they facilitate the process of selfformulated in Carolene Products as an attempt to reconcile the tension that inheres
between paragraphs two and three of footnote four.
183. This is obviously not meant to be an exhaustive list. Moreover, some items that
could be included in such a list might be highly contestable. But that is precisely the point.
In order to better understand the functions of democratic politics, we need to discover the
values that make possible the ends and purposes of democracy.
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government and legitimate democratic decisionmaking. Though state
actors can determine how to take these principles into account in the
design of democratic institutions, judicial review, through the
application of constitutional pluralism, is triggered when institutional
structures of representation do not reflect these core democratic
values or when the state has abandoned some democratic principles
in the pursuit of a single, though legitimate, democratic goal.
While Baker is widely celebrated as one of the Court's best
moments, the opinion is remarkably short on constitutional theory.
The question least directly answered by Baker is whether the Court's
interference with Tennessee's representative structure, and with the
representative structures of almost all states, can be justified. Justice
Brennan devoted a majority of the opinion to explaining why
reapportionment disputes are justiciable but never explained how the
plaintiffs' malapportionment claim states a cause of action under the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The best explanation Justice Brennan gave in Baker was to state
"it has been open to courts since the enactment of the Fourteenth
Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that a
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious
action."'" Justice Clark picked up the same refrain with his assertion
that "Tennessee's apportionment is a crazy quilt without rational
basis."" 5 But as Justices Frankfurter and Harlan countered, the state
18 6
was pursuing a rational policy, that of interest representation.
Tennessee chose to overrepresent rural interests as against urban
interests.' 17 Perhaps Justice Clark was correct that the policy was not
perfectly implemented, but surely it was a rational pursuit.1'8 Even
assuming that one agrees with Justice Clark that Tennessee's
apportionment scheme contained too many deviations such that it
could not be explained on interest representation grounds, could it
not still be rationally defended as mere incumbency protection? 8 9

184. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,226 (1962).
185. Id. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring); id at 258 (Clark, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 334 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("A State's choice to distribute electoral
strength among geographical units, rather than according to a census of population, is
certainly no less a rational decision of policy than would be its choice to levy a tax on
property rather than a tax on income.").
187. Id. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
188. ELY, supra note 105, at 121-22.

189. Baker, 369 U.S. at 336 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("Surely it lies within the
province of a state legislature to conclude that.., in the interest of stability of government
it would be best to defer for some further time the redistribution of seats in the state
legislature.").
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As Alexander Bickel argued in one of his many comments on the
Court's reapportionment revolution, 19° applying a rationality standard
to the problem of apportionment "is very nearly meaningless."'191

Bickel did not reject entirely equality of representation or
majoritarianism as a principle' 92 nor did he reject the Court's
intervention in Baker. 93 What he rejected was the proposition that
190. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 189-98 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter BICKEL,
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH]; ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND

THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 34-42, 151-81 (2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter BICKEL, THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS]; BICKEL, POLITICS, supra note 98, at 175-98.
191. BICKEL, POLITICS, supra note 98, at 180; see also id. at 181 (stating that "it seems
plain that the conventional test of rationality cannot lead anywhere in this field"). Bickel
understands the Court's rationality test to be susceptible to two different interpretations.
First, government action can fail the rationality test where, though the government has
broad discretion to act, there is not a rational relationship between the means and the
ends. Id.at 177-78 ("But it may not follow that because the federal government is
empowered to regulate 'commerce among the several states' is it empowered also to
establish a uniform law of divorce. At least we should have to know more about the
relation of divorces to the operation of a national economy before we could call this
connection rational."). Second, "[i]n exercising any of its powers, government, state or
federal, will be permitted to make only those choices which rest on an intelligible and
plausible view of reality." Id. at 178. Thus, it would be rational for the government to
conclude that "a man who is an active member of the Communist party at the very least
does not look with disfavor upon a violent overthrow of existing American institutions."
Id. at 179. But under this second reading of rationality, it would be irrational for the
government to declare that "once a man is a Communist he will always remain one, no
matter what present disclaimers he may enter." Id Neither applications of the rationality
test helps resolve the constitutionality of malapportionment. As Bickel noted:
Applying the first branch of the test obviously leads nowhere. It is conceded all
around that the power to apportion, to create constituencies, and otherwise to
regulate the manner in which public officials and legislators are elected is a
legitimate function of government. The question then comes whether this or that
apportionment, restricting the electorate in this or that faction, or favoring this or
that portion of it with more or less influence is rational-or rather, whether it is
irrational; the question, as always, is not whether reason compels the legislative
choice but whether reason is repelled by it.
Now most, if not all,
malapportionments favor rural interests of one sort or another over urban and
suburban, allocate more strength proportionately to sparsely populated areas
than to densely populated ones, and make similar discriminations. Who can say
that this is irrational? Undesirable, perhaps; but irrational?
l at 180.
192. See BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 190, at 174.
193. Bickel, supra note 129, at 78. Bickel's strongest objection was to the Court's strict
one person, one vote principle. See, e.g., BICKEL, POLITICS, supra note 98, at 196-98;
BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 190, at 151-81. It is accurate to recognize
that Bickel's understanding of Baker and his evaluation of the Court's reapportionment
revolution evolved somewhat over time. Writing soon after Baker, Bickel explained
Baker.
[A]s holding no more than that, Tennessee having last been malapportioned sixty
years ago, the situation there is the result, not of a deliberate if imperfect present

2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM

1145

majoritarianism is the only value that must be reflected in the
apportionment process. "The issue ...is one of the distribution of

access and power among various groups, and the answer requires
normative choices and prophetic judgments-much as does the
solution of other problems of social policy."'194 For Bickel, a
rationality test is engaged in the wrong inquiry. The question is not
whether the state's action is rational-because it is clearly so-but

"rather, what principles restrict otherwise rational choices that a

legislature might make?' 1 95 "This is the question that the Court not

only left unanswered in Baker v. Carr,but rather went out of its way
to obscure.'196

If Baker cannot be explained on the grounds that Tennessee's
reapportionment scheme was irrational, does constitutional pluralism
provide some interpretive insight? The object here is to identify the
presuppositions of democratic theory that are violated by Tennessee's
reapportionment scheme.
Tennessee's apportionment scheme
violated four core assumptions of democratic
theory:
majoritarianism, responsiveness, substantial political equality, and
interest representation.

Although the Court may not have self-

consciously referenced these principles, a concern with the essence of

judgment of the political institutions, but merely of inertial and oligarchic
entrenchment. In the face of so faint an assertion, if any, by the political
institutions of their own function, the principled goal of equal representation had
enough vitality to enable the Court to prod the Tennessee political institutions
into action.
BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 190, at 196. On this reading, Bickel
found the result in Baker "unexceptional." BICKEL, POLITICS, supra note 98, at 176. As
the Court and lower courts became more involved with apportionment, Bickel concluded
that "the Court has intervened unwisely, beyond the limits of effective legal action, into
the necessary work of politics." Id at xi. Bickel concluded that the proper remedy for
malapportionment "lies with the majoritarian executive, whom we can influence, and
whose own bargaining power can very properly be heightened by federal judicial holdings
striking down obsolete apportionments and requiring legislature to act affirmatively." Id
at 190. Perhaps his most charitable evaluation of the Court's reapportionment handiwork
is contained in BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 190, at 173-81, in which he
predicted that the Court's reapportionment project was heading toward obsolescence and
abandonment because the Court as an institution is incapable of forming lasting social
policy because social problems are complex, fast-moving, and unpredictable.
194. BICKEL, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 190, at 35.
195. BICKEL, POLITICS, supra note 98, at 181; see also BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH, supra note 190, at 196 ("The question is, should [pursuit of] such purposes [as
over-representation of some or of all rural areas] be foreclosed, should they be foreclosed
in all circumstances, and why? What is the dominant principle?").
196. BICKEL, POLITICS, supra note 98, at 182; id. at 188 ("It remains to ask whether we
have evolved or can see emerging some other operative principle-other than equal
representation-which is capable of general application.").
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each of these democratic values is reflected, in some cases
overwhelmingly so, in the multiple opinions in Baker.
1. Majoritarianism
By almost all conceptions of democracy, any polity that fancies
itself democratic must at least be responsive 9 7 to majoritarian
interests, commonly referred to as majority rule.198 As concerned as
he was with majoritarian tyranny, Madison nevertheless understood
that a democratic polity's legitimacy depended upon some form of
majoritarian influence. Majority rule was implicit in the form of
government he favored.
Thus, he defined a republic as a
"government which derives all of its powers directly or indirectly
from the great body of the people."'199 In one of the rare expressed
concerns with minority rule, Madison continued:
197. Just to be clear, I am simply concerned here with majoritarianism; responsiveness
is addressed, infra notes 207-23. On the relationship between responsiveness and
majoritarianism, see Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Challenges to Racial
Redistrictingin the New Millenium: Hunt v. Cromartie As a Case Study, 58 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 227,289-90 (2000).
198. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34-62 (1956);
GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 19 (1962); GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE
THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED 24, 31 (1987) [hereinafter SARTORI, THEORY OF
DEMOCRACY]; see also DAHL, supra, at 34 ("Running through the whole history of
democratic theories is the identification of 'democracy' with political equality, popular
sovereignty, and rule by majorities.").
To be clear, I use majority rule here not in the sense of absolute majority rule, but
in the sense used by Professor Sartori-majority rule as a "shorthand formula for limited
majority rule, for a restrained majority rule that respects minority rights," or limited
majority rule. SARTORI, THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, supra, at 34. As Professor Guinier

has reminded us:
[D]emocracy as majority rule is not self-defining. It could mean control of issue
outcomes, voting aggregations to maximize satisfaction, determining the
preponderance of opinion, or simply decisionmaking by electorally accountable
officials. Indeed, there is an ongoing debate over the existence and possibility of
majority rule generally. Some also question directly the presumptive faith in
majority rule as quintessentially democratic. Others argue that institutionalizing
minority rights is a necessary constraint on the processes of majoritarian
democracy.
LANI

GUINIER,

TYRANNY OF

THE

MAJORITY:

FUNDAMENTAL

FAIRNESS

IN

REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 78 (1994). Moreover, as she has illuminated with
peerless pellucidity, unqualified majoritarianism also raises questions of fundamental
fairness and legitimacy. See id.Professor Guinier and I differ only to the extent that she
questions the "presumptive faith in majority rule as quintessentially democratic," whereas
I find that some minimum level of majoritarianism is necessary before a state can be
deemed democratic. It.at 78. Thus, for example, Dahl,who argues that majorities need
not in fact rule, notes however that there must some consensus on the ground rules of
democratic engagement. DAHL, supra; see also JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 4 (1980).
199. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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It is essential to such a government that it be derived from
the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
proportion or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of
tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a
delegation of their powers, might aspire to the rank of
republicans and claim for their government the honorable
title of republic.2 0
Consequently, as Madison and other democratic theorists have
remarked, a state cannot define itself as democratic if it does not at
the very least respond to the preferences of at least a majority of its
citizens.02
One explanation for the Court's involvement in the political
process in Baker was to assure compliance with this core requirement
of democracy. 2 Justice Clark's concurrence in Baker was the first to
justify the Court's involvement as a remedy for minority rule. Justice
Clark believed that as a consequence of minority rule the "majority of
the voters [in Tennessee] have been caught up in a legislative strait
jacket. ' 20 3 Justice Stewart, who joined the majority in Baker but
dissented in a number of post-Baker decisions, also explained the
Court's decision to enter the political thicket on the importance of
restoring majority rule. Justice Stewart states:
I think that the Equal Protection Clause demands but two
basic attributes of any plan of state legislative
apportionment. First it demands that, in the light of the
State's own characteristics and needs, the plan must be a
rational one. Secondly, it demands that the plan must be
such as not to permit the systematic frustration of the will of
a majority of the electorate of the State. °4

200. Id.
201. See generally DON HERZOG, HAPPY SLAVES:

A

CRITIQUE OF CONSENT

THEORY 205 (1989) (offering a critique of what he terms "consent theory"). Again,
democratic theory has also been concerned with unmitigated majoritarian power and I do
not mean to minimize that concern. See Lani Guinier, [EiracingDemocracy: The Voting
Rights Cases, 108 HARv. L. REv. 109, 125-26 (1994). Acknowledging majoritarianism as
a core democratic value simply reflects the plain contention that as a theoretical
proposition, majority rule is better than minority rule.
202. See, e.g., James U. Blacksher & Larry T. Menefee, From Reynolds v. Sims to City
of Mobile v. Bolden: Have the White Suburbs Commandeered the Fifteenth Amendment,
34 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 5-17 (1982). As a consequence of extreme malapportionment,
Tennessee's representative institutions, including both its upper and lower chambers, were
not representative of the majority's interests. Id.
203. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,259 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
204. Lucas v. Colo. Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 753-54 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); see also id. at 754 ("I think it is apparent that any plan of legislative
apportionment which could be shown to reflect no policy, but simply arbitrary and
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Justice Stewart then explained that his interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause is consistent with the Court's decision in
Baker:
In Baker v. Carr,it was alleged that a substantial numerical
majority had an effective voice in neither legislative house of
Tennessee. Failure to reapportion for 60 years in flagrant
violation of the Tennessee Constitution and in the face of
intervening population growth and movement had created
enormous disparities among legislative districts-even
among districts seemingly identical in composition, which, it
was alleged, perpetuated minority rule and could not be
justified on any rational basis0 5
Similarly, as a consequence of this frustration of the majority rule,
Justice Clark opined:
Although I find the Tennessee apportionment statute
offends the Equal Protection Clause, I would not consider
intervention by this Court into so delicate a field if there
were any other relief available to the people of Tennessee.
But the majority of the people of Tennessee have no
"practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at
existing
"invidious
the
polls"
to correct the
discrimination." 2°6
Thus, the Court's involvement in reapportionment can be justified on
the democratic theory ground that minority rule is inimical to a
democratic process. To the extent that ours is a constitutional
democracy or a republic, minority rule cannot be justified.
2. Responsiveness
There is a second aspect of extreme malapportionment that
violates another core democratic value; acute malapportionment
effectuates a lack of responsiveness in institutional representative
structures. 207 Responsiveness, which is a related though separate
concept from majoritarianism, describes the relationship between the
representative
views
and preferences-and
electorate-its

capricious action or inaction, and that any plan which could be shown systematically to
prevent ultimate effective majority rule, would be invalid under accepted Equal Protection
Clause standards.").
205. Id at 754 & n.13.
206. Baker, 369 U.S. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring).
207. Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of PoliticalCompetition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1611
(1999) (referring to responsiveness as a "central democratic value").
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institutions.2? 8
Responsiveness conveys how well democratic
institutions track the substantive preferences of the electorate. The
more democratic institutions react antiphonally to the expressed

preferences of the electorate the more they can be classified as
responsive.
Responsiveness is the linchpin of democratic governance and the
sine qua non of a representative democracy.20 9
Republican

government, the Madisonian solution to preserving liberty in large
polities, is absolutely dependent upon the concept of
representation 1 As Hannah Pitkin has shown, self-government
through representative institutions is possible only when
representatives are responsive to the needs of the electorate' Pitkin
argues:
It seems to me that we show a government to be

representative not by demonstrating its control over its
subjects but just the reverse, by demonstrating that its
subjects have control over what it does. Every government's
actions are attributed to its subjects formally, legally. But in
a representative government this attribution has substantive

content: the people really do act through their government,
and are not merely passive recipients of its actions. A
representative government must not merely be in control,
208. Paul D. Schumaker & Russell W. Getter, Responsiveness Bias in 51 American

Communities, 21 AM. J. POL. Sci. 247, 248 (1977). Professors Schumaker and Russell
define responsiveness as follows:
Responsiveness refers to a stimulus-response relationship. Responsiveness
occurs when actors react positively to an external stimulus. Unresponsiveness
occurs when actors fail to react contrary to the way desired by those providing
the stimulus. Thus, the concept of responsiveness is concerned with the degree
of linkage or congruence between stimulus variables and response variables.
Id.
209. HERZOG, supra note 201, at 205 ("Given the conditions of modern society ... any
plausible account of legitimacy and obligation must center on whether the state is for the
most part responsive to the people."); see also id. at 208 ("One can imagine (just barely) a
society happy to live under the rule of an unresponsive state. I'd call them happy slaves;
no matter how happy they were, we couldn't, in my view, invoke the consent of the
governed in describing their situation."); SIDNEY VERBA & NORMAN H. NIE,
PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA:

POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 300

(1972) ("Responsiveness is what democracy is supposed to be about. ... ").
210. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 82 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(stating that in a republic one can "refine and enlarge the public views by passing them
through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true
interest of their country whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice
it to temporary or partial considerations").
211. HANNAH PrrKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 209 (1967)
("[R]epresenting ... means acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner
responsive to them.").
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not merely promote the public interest, but must also be
responsive to the people. 12
There may be multiple ways of demonstrating the
responsiveness, or lack thereof, of representative institutions.
Governments can adopt policies that are congruent with citizen
preferences; 13 governments can distribute goods in a manner that is
consistent with the distributional preferences of citizens; or
governments can otherwise behave in a manner that reflects the value
predilections of citizens.
Irrespective of one's preferred method for identifying
responsiveness, any list must include elections and the availability of
the franchise as a mechanism for ensuring and measuring
responsiveness. 214 As Pitkin notes, a "representative government
requires that there be machinery for the expression of the wishes of
the represented, and the government respond to these wishes. '215 An
election system fulfills that function; it is an important and necessary
mechanism through which the electorate exercises control over its
representatives. 216 The argument here is not that elections necessarily
212. Id. at 232. Professor Herzog is also particularly insightful on this point. He
maintains:
[R]esponsiveness can serve as the core of a theory of legitimacy, obligation, and
disobedience. It is also ...at the core of the consent of the governed; it's what
people are most deeply gesturing toward when they invoke that phrase. It's not
that "responsiveness" itself explicates the concept of consent; it doesn't. After
all, one can always coherently ask if people have consented to live under a
responsive state. Rather it's that if we draw up a list of regimes that we
intuitively want to say rest on the consent of the governed, another list of those
that don't, the states on the first list turn out to be the responsive ones. Consent
here is just the opposite of repression, of policies being imposed with no regard
for the people's wishes.
HERZOG, supra note 201, at 207.
213. VERBA & NIE, supra note 209, at 300.
214. See HERZOG, supra note 201, at 213 (noting that though voting is not the "only
mechanism that ensures responsiveness ... it's the obvious leading contender"); see also
DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN & RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION LAW:

CASES AND

MATERIALS 25 (2001) ("If the election mechanism is at the heart of any democracy, then
the right to vote in elections is a central democratic right and the act of voting is the most
elemental form of democratic participation.").
215. PITKIN, supra note 211, at 232.
216. DAHL, supra note 198, at 131. To be clear, I focus on elections here not because

they are the only method of political participation, but because elections are foundational
in a representative democracy. Elections are a distinctive and important type of political
participation and, of course, they are clearly relevant to Baker and the apportionment
cases. See HERZOG, supra note 201, at 213, 219; JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN
CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 25 (1991); Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the
Right Thing: Single-Member Offices andthe Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REv. 1, 6 (1991).
But cf. GUINIER, supra note 198, at 66-69 (explaining why electoral responsiveness may
not facilitate self-government work in the context of racial representation).
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indicate substantive majoritarian preferences;217 in fact Dahl argues
that they do not.218 Rather, the argument is that elections facilitate
self-government by selecting leaders whose responsibility .is to act in
the interest of the people and who can be held accountable if they
behave in a manner that is inimical to the interests of those they
represent.
Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Baker provides the most
insight on this issue. As he noted, in Tennessee, a minority of the
State's population elected the majority of its representatives, resulting

in minority rule.219 Moreover, the state could not provide a rational
basis for minority rule. Justice Clark rejects the justification
preferred by Justices Frankfurter and Harlan-that Tennessee's
reapportionment scheme reflected an attempt to divide political

power between rural and urban counties-on the grounds that
"discrimination is present among counties of like population. '22°
But interestingly, Justice Clark would not invalidate Tennessee's
apportionment scheme on the formalistic grounds that the counties
are of unequal population, resulting in minority rule. As he explains,
"Although I find the Tennessee apportionment statute offends the
Equal Protection Clause, I would not consider intervention by this
Court into so delicate a field if there were any other relief available to
the people of Tennessee."'" The problem identified by Justice Clark
is the absence of responsiveness. Tennessee suffered from a failure of
217. SARTORI, THEORY OF DEMOCRACY, supra note 198, at 139; see also id. at 108
("Succinctly stated, elections do not enact policies; elections establish, rather, who will
enact them. Elections do not decide issues; they decide, rather, who will decide issues.").
But cf. GUINIER, supra note 198, at 66-69 (explaining why electoral responsiveness may
not facilitate self-government work in the context of racial representation).
218. DAHL, supra note 198, at 125-31.
219. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,253 (1962) (Clark, J., concurring).
220. Id at 256 (Clark, J., concurring) ("It discriminates horizontally creating gross
disparities between rural areas themselves as well as between urban areas themselves, still
maintaining the wide vertical disparity already pointed out between rural and urban.").
221. Baker,369 U.S. at 258-59 (Clark, J., concurring). Justice Clark further explained:
But the majority of the people of Tennessee have no "practical opportunities for
exerting their political weight at the polls" to correct the existing "invidious
discrimination." Tennessee has no initiative and referendum. I have searched
diligently for other "practical opportunities" present under the law. I find none
other than through the federal courts. The majority of the voters have been
caught up in a legislative strait jacket. Tennessee has an "informed, civically
militant electorate" and "an aroused popular conscience," but it does not sear
"the conscience of the people's representatives." This is because the legislative
policy has riveted the present seats in the Assembly to their respective
constituencies, and by the votes of their incumbents a reapportionment of any
kind is prevented.
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representation. Though a majority of Tennesseans was opposed to
Tennessee's apportionment scheme, they could not convince their
representatives to act upon their preferences.
Additionally, Tennessee's extant apportionment implicated other
substantive interests of Tennesseeans. Commentators have argued
that as a consequence of extreme malapportionment, urban voters
could not get state legislators to pay attention to their unique
interests.m State legislators could and did effectively ignore the
preferences of urban voters, who constituted the majority of voters in
many states.
If the ideal of self-government is to be at all meaningful, victims
of such blatant violations must find recourse in the courts. The
majority and concurring Justices were clearly persuaded that judicial
supervision was warranted in Baker in order to restore effective
representation.2 3 Thus, Baker can be understood as a vindication of
responsiveness as a core democratic value.
3. Substantial Political Equality
If elections are to serve such lofty goals and protect individual
liberty and equality, they must be governed by certain parameters.
For example, they must be free; that is, individuals should not be
coerced.
Relatedly, individuals must have genuine choices!2 4
Additionally, the election process must not be substantially affected
by fraud or deceit.'
Other such examples may be multiplied; the
point is simply that under any base understanding of democratic
theory, the simple fact that a polity holds elections does not indicate,
ipso facto, that the electorate is self-governing. Thus, these and other
parameters are important and worthy of further reflection.
Political equality in the structures of representation is an
additional consideration, one that is most relevant and fundamental
222. Anthony Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L.
REv. 1057, 1058 (1958). As Lewis states:
It is evident that one of our major national failures since World War II has been
the failure to meet the problems of rapid urbanization. The decay of the center
city, disorderly suburban growth, and crises in education, housing, and
transportation have become familiar facts in every metropolitan area. A
fundamental reason that these problems have not been adequately met is urban
political weakness, stemming in large part from the underrepresentation of urban
areas in the state and national legislatures.
Id.; see also id. at 1064 (noting the rural bias of malapportionment).
223. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 259-60.
224. See HERZOG, supra note 201, at 199.
225. United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383, 385-89 (1962); United States v. Saylor, 322
U.S. 385,389 (1944).
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to Baker and the apportionment cases. 26 Political equality is
unquestionably one of the conceptual pillars of democratic theory. 7
Indeed, political equality is important in a democratic state for
numerous reasons including facilitating self-government, enabling
individuals to acquire their fair share of goodies, and communicating
standing in the community.s
Knowing that political equality is important does not tell us how
to define or identify political equality in structures of representation.
The concept raises a host of thorny issues. As Jonathan Still has
remarked:
Does [political equality] mean that in any election each
person casts one and only one vote? Does it mean that each
person has the same chance of casting a vote which
determines the outcome? Or does it mean that it does not
matter who holds which preference, so that if preferences
are interchanged among the voters the result of the election
remains unchanged? 2 9
Understanding political equality is vital because the existence,
vel non, of political equality is not often an "either-or" proposition.
In other words, political equality is best understood as existing along
a continuum. On one end of the continuum lies a position of no
equality and on the other end resides absolute equality. The
conclusion that an electoral system satisfies the requirement of
political equality necessitates identifying the point on the continuum
that one believes provides meaningful political equality. As Justice
Frankfurter stated in Baker,
Talk of "debasement" or [vote] "dilution" is circular talk.
One cannot speak of "debasement" or "dilution" of the
value of a vote until there is first defined a standard of
reference as to what a vote should be worth. What is
actually asked of the Court in this case is to choose among
competing bases of representation-ultimately, really,
among competing theories of political philosophy-in order
226. As Jonathan Still has noted, political equality has many different components: the
relationship between economic factors and politics; the relationship between sociological
factors and politics; and the relationship between structural institutions and politics, in
particular voting. In this Article, I am only concerned with the institutional component of
political equality.

See Jonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91

ETHICS 375,377 (1981).
227. JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY 233 (1980).
228. The reasons mentioned above as well as others that can be generated fall into one
of two categories: instrumental and expressive. Political equality is important because it
preserves other rights and is a distinctive marker of citizenship.
229. Still, supra note 226, at 375.
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to establish an appropriate frame of government for the

State of Tennessee and thereby for all the States of the
Union.230
Frankfurter is certainly right that talk of debasement and dilution are
circular unless the standard of reference is first defined.-31 Talking
about political equality in the abstract does not help us to understand
where we are on the continuum and what is at stake among
competing notions of political equality. Let us first spell out some
possible meanings for the phrase political equality, before we try to
get some leverage on the Court's conception of political equality in
Baker.

Political equality can be understood as referring to any of the
following presuppositions. z 2 The first is universal equal suffrage:
everyone must have a vote and they must have an equal number of
votes? 33 Second, everyone's vote must count. 234 Third, all votes must
count equally 3 5 Fourth, everyone must have an equal chance of
affecting the outcome of the election. 36 Fifth, voters must have equal
power to affect legislative outcomesl 37 Sixth, legislators must have
equal power in proportion to the population represented. 31
With these conceptions of political equality in mind, we can now
turn to Baker and try to determine which of these conceptions best
explain the Court's decision. Recall that one of the points of dispute

230. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 182,300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
231. For example, see Justice Thomas's concurrence in Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,
899 (1994) ("Such conclusions, of course, depend upon a certain theory of the 'effective'
vote, a theory that is not inherent in the concept of representative democracy itself.").
Justice Thomas's views are particularly relevant in this context; if one were to follow the
logical implications of his concurrence in Holder, one would have to conclude that the
Court must overrule Baker. For a reply to Justice Thomas, see Guinier, supra note 201.
232. Of course these presuppositions are not all-inclusive. I have selected the more
relevant and common presuppositions.
233. See Still, supra note 226, at 377-78.
234. See HERZOG, supra note 201, at 199.
235. See Ronald Rogowski, Representation in PoliticalTheory and in Law, 91 ETHICS,
395,399 (1981); Still, supra note 226, at 378-80.
236. See Rogowski, supra note 235, at 399; Still, supra note 226, at 380-82.
237. See generally Guinier, supra note 201, at 137 (proposing that "courts embrace the
concept of group representation as a universal remedial principle of democratic
accountability and legitimacy"); see also Bernard Grofman, Fair and Equal
Representation,91 ETHICS 477,477-78 & n.1 (1981); Pamela S. Karlan, The Rights to Vote:
Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1709-20 (1993) (stating that
political equality includes the right to cast a ballot, the right to a cast a ballot that counts,
and the right to cast a ballot that embodies a fair chance to influence legislative policymaking).
238. See Grofman, supranote 237, at 477-78 & n.1.
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among the various Justices was whether the availability of universal
suffrage is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of political equality.
Once again, Frankfurter's discursion on this matter will serve as
an invaluable repartee and point of departure. He states:
What, then, is this question of legislative apportionment?
Appellants invoke the right to vote and to have their votes
counted. But they are permitted to vote and their votes are
counted. They go to the polls, they cast their ballots, they
send their representatives to the state councils. Their
complaint is simply that the representatives are not
sufficiently numerous or powerful-in short, that Tennessee
has adopted a basis of representation with which they are
dissatisfied.P 9
It is essential to note here that Frankfurter is mistaken to the
extent that he implies that the majority's conclusion in Baker
impermissibly and necessarily relies upon notions of democratic
theory, whereas his conclusion eschews such reliance.
By
Frankfurter's own terms, satisfying political equality requires a
baseline understanding of what political equality requires. Moreover,
Frankfurter also relies upon notions of democratic theory to the
extent that he argues that judicial involvement in democratic politics
is anti-democratic. 240 Consequently, as Frankfurter unwittingly
demonstrates, repair to democratic theory is unavoidable when
thinking about the relationship between the Constitution and the
democratic process.
What, then, is Frankfurter's baseline? For Frankfurter, the fact
that the plaintiffs were able to vote and to have their vote counted is
sufficient to satisfy his standard for political equality.2 41 Having
powerful representatives, however, is not a core requirement of
political equality. We can conclude that Frankfurter believes political
equality is satisfied once the second presupposition is met. It is not
sufficient that individuals have the ability to vote; their votes must
also count. But as long as their votes count, Frankfurter's required
baseline is satisfied.

239. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 299-300 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
240. See, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553-54 (1946) ("It is hostile to a
democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.").
241. See also Baker, 368 U.S. at 300 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("This is not a case in
which a State has, through a device however oblique and sophisticated, denied Negroes or
Jews or redheaded persons a vote, or given them only a third or a sixth of a vote.").
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What of the majority? What is its understanding of political
equality? The Baker majority reasoned that individuals have a right
under the Fourteenth Amendment not to have their votes debased,
diluted, or rendered otherwise less effective as a consequence of
population inequality.2 42 Similarly, Justices Douglas and Clark, in

their respective concurrences, also expressed their concerns with the
consequences of population inequality.243 For both Justices Douglas
and Clark, political equality is concerned with the extent to which "a
State [may] weight the vote of one county or one district more heavily
than it weights the vote in another."'2" Political equality is implicated
when "a single vote in Moore County, Tennessee, is worth 19 votes in
Hamilton County, that one vote in Stewart or in Chester County is
worth nearly eight times a single vote in Shelby or Knox County."
Where then can we place the majority and concurrences on our
political equality continuum? For the majority, though an individual
may be able to vote and have her vote count, political equality is not
satisfied if the votes of other citizens count for more. Likewise, for
Justices Douglas and Clark, political equality is satisfied only when all
votes count the same.
Of course this begs an obvious question: What does it mean that
all votes count the same? Perhaps we can answer this question by
trying to understand what "counting the same" does not mean. If the
concurring Justices' understanding of Baker is to be credited,
counting the same does not mean absolute equality. I believe this is
what Justice Douglas meant when he asserted that "[u]niversal
'245
equality is not the test; there is room for weighting.
Correspondingly, Justice Clark maintained that "[n]o one ...
contends that mathematical equality among voters is required by the
'
Equal Protection Clause."246

Baker's substantial equality requirement gives rise to two
important observations. First, the Court in Baker set the floor for
equality but not the ceiling. Presumably, by setting the floor, the
Court permitted state actors to provide greater political equality, as
many conceptions of political equality undoubtedly exist. The
242. Baker,369 U.S. at 187-88,194,207-08.
243. Id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., concurring); idat 251-62 (Clark, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 244 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 254 (Clark, J., concurring) (noting and
cataloguing the "wide disparity of voting strength" in Tennessee).
245. Id. at 244-45 (Douglas, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 258 (Clark, J.,concurring); see also id. at 260 (Clark, J.,concurring)
("Moreover, there is no requirement that any plan have mathematical exactness in its
application. Only where, as here, the total picture reveals incommensurables of both
magnitude and frequency can it be said that there is present an invidious discrimination.").
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Court's decision to choose substantial equality over absolute equality
bespeaks the Court's role in this interpretive enterprise.

Second, equality is only one of many interests that must be
satisfied by representative structures. Though equality in voting is
important,

it need not be maximized to comport with the

Constitution. Maximization is accompanied by costs and trade-offs;
to the extent that political actors are forced to maximize one value, it

comes at the expense of another.2 47 Given the multiplicity of values
that must be taken into account by political actors, no one value can
be effectively maximized unless other worthy values are sacrificed. 24
4. Pluralism and Interest Representation
A fourth core conceptual pillar of modem democratic theory is
pluralism. Democratic politics is best understood as a struggle among
various groups for political power.2 49 The best account of the role
247. See Fuentes-Rhower & Charles, supra note 197, at 292-94 (discussing the trade-off
hypothesis).
248. An apt point of comparison here is the Court's approach to judicial regulation of
the political process in the Shaw line of cases. In sharp contrast to Baker, the Court in
Shaw and its progeny, threatened to enforce an absolute standard of political equalitycolorblindness. As most observers have remarked, this attempt has utterly failed.
Relatedly, the Court's subsequent attempt in the redistricting context to enforce an
absolute norm of political equality has also been regarded as a failure. Baker's approach
to judicial review of the political process provides an important lesson to the Court's
continuing struggle with the proper method of promulgating and enforcing a norm of
political equality.

249.

ANTHONY

H. BIRCH, THE CONCEPTS AND THEORIES

OF MODERN DEMOCRACY

55 (1993) (concluding that "conflict between group pressures is a central characteristic of
American politics"). Given that political pluralism is important to my approach, it is
necessary to address two potential concerns. First, I recognize that pluralism has lost its
appeal in the world of legal academia. See, e.g., Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The
ChangingStructure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 603
(1995) ("The pluralist vision, once dominant among political theorists and legal scholars,
no longer maintains its intellectual monopoly."). But see Richard L. Hasen, Clipping
Coupons for Democracy: An Egalitarian/PublicChoice Defense of Campaign Finance
Vouchers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1996) (advocating "egalitarian pluralism" both as a
positive theory of how the world of politics works and as a normative theory of political
equality). Nevertheless, the core insight of political pluralism continues to maintain its
vitality. Second, my reliance on political pluralism does not mean that other approaches,
in particular public choice theory, neo-republicanism, or deliberative democracy do not
have anything to contribute to constitutional pluralism as a method of interpretation. For
example, some commentators have criticized direct democracy devices such as initiatives
and referenda on the grounds that they inhibit the dialogic process envisioned by
adherents of deliberative democracy. See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1525-56 (1990) (noting the heightened importance of
judicial review of direct democracy initiatives due to the removal of the legislative process,
which normally acts as a "filter" of majority preferences); Philip P. Frickey, The
Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct Democracy, and the
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that groups play in democratic society is pluralism 0 It is based upon
the contention that there are different conceptions of the good and it
incorporates classical liberalism's respect of the right of others to
pursue their vision of the good. 1 As Alexander Hamilton intimated,
in a democracy one expects different groups-with different interests
and competing versions of the good-to vie for political power.
This process is inevitable. The role of the Court is to demarcate the
boundary within which this struggle is to take place. The object here
is not to minimize power, but to recognize its deployment and its
effect on various groups within the democratic polity, and to limit its

scope.

3

Privatizationof the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 421, 429 (1998) ("The decline
of the deliberative ideal in the modem era has paralleled the revival of direct
democracy."); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referendums in
Which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 414
(1999) ("[C]omplex issues are presented to the voters on a yes or no basis without the
benefits of deliberation and without the check of representatives having to be accountable
to the interests of others."). Similarly, much can be learned from Professor Chantal
Mouffe's insight on the relationship between conflict and politics. As she states:
A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political
positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation
will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective
identification, as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on
consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with
political participation.
CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 104 (2000).
250. James A. Gardner, Madison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of
ElectoralSystems, 86 IOWA L. REv. 87, 105 (2000); Guinier, supra note 201, at 125-26. It
is important here for me to point out that even though I use the term "pluralism" to
provide a thick normative orientation for judicial supervision of democratic politics, I also
mean for it to provide a descriptive and thin orientation for judicial supervision of
democratic politics. In addition to the normative orientation, pluralism is a useful word
because it implies that the Court must take into account multiple values in regulating law
and politics. More often than not, the Court is inclined to seize upon one value-for
example, one person, one vote-and attempt to enforce that value to the exclusion of all
others. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 113, at 1650 (remarking that "the instrumental
aspect of the equipopulation rule lost its vitality as the one person, one vote rule became
increasingly reified as the functional definition of what it meant for an electoral process to
be politically fair").
251. JOHN RAWvLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xvii (1993) (noting the "fact" of
pluralism); see also Chantal Mouffe, Democracy, Power, and the "Political," in
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:

CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL

246 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (explaining that the fact of pluralism implies the
"legitimation of conflict and division, the emergence of individual liberty, and the
assertion of equal liberty for all").
252. THE FEDERALIST No. 61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
253. As Professor Mouffe remarks, to deny power "is to ignore the limits imposed on
the extension of the sphere of rights by the fact that some existing rights have been
constructed on the very exclusion or subordination of others." MOUFFE, supra note 249,
at 20.

2002]

CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM

1159

Since there are many versions of pluralism, let me be clear with
respect to the version that I prefer here. I am particularly interested
with the conception of pluralism as interest group politics3 4 Classical
pluralism theorized that society is composed of individuals with
different interests and preferences. "When individuals find they have
interests in common that can be advanced through collective action,
they are stimulated to form groups, which then serve as vehicles for
the transmission of interests into the political system." 5 This
grouping is a natural occurrence, the consequence of individuals
recognizing a mutual commonality of interests. 6 The basic theory of
classical pluralism is that politics or public policy is in great part the
result of conflict and accommodation of various interest groups.
The purpose of the struggle is to persuade government officials to
direct public policy in favor of organized interests as these interests
attempt to pursue their self-defined goalsY8
Classical pluralists not only assumed that in a democratic regime
individuals would group together naturally to protect and advance
their interests by pressuring the government; they also suggested that
interests would be manifold and diverse. This conclusion of diversity
and multiplicity of interests rested upon two suppositions. First, the
classical pluralists argued that though resources are not equally
distributed, they are sufficiently available to enable any interest group
with strong preferences to pressure government officials2 9 Second,
they also maintained that the pressure system is sufficiently open to
welcome a diversity of interests and capable of handling multiple
interests. As a consequence of this diversity and multiplicity of
interests, no single interest group can dictate policy outcomes. As
Dahl concluded, "it is a rarity for any coalition to carry out its policies
without having to bargain, negotiate, and compromise with its
254. See Nicholas R. Miller, Pluralismand Social Choice, 77 AM. POL. SC. REV. 734,
735 (1983).
255. Terry M. Moe, Toward a Broader View of Interest Groups, 43 J. POL. 531, 532
(1981).
256. But see MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECrIVE ACrION 2 (1965) (positing
that "even if all of the individuals in a large group are rational and self-interested, ... they
will still not voluntarily act to achieve their common or group interest").
257. DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 203 (1996); Darryl Baskin, American
Pluralism: Theory, Practice, and Ideology, 32 J. POL. 71, 73 (1970) ("Group or pluralist
theory attempts to explain the formulation of public policy and the maintenance of public
order in terms of the interplay among the contention group forces of society."); Gardner,
supranote 250, at 104.
258. Baskin, supranote 257, at 73.
259. John F. Manley, Neo-Pluralism: A Class Analysis of PluralismI and Pluralism1I,
77 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 368,368-69 (1983).
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opponents; often, indeed, it wins a victory in one institution only to
' 26
suffer defeat in another. 0
The attractiveness of classical pluralism is its tantalizing promise
that representative democracy is capable of responding to all
interests. This promise is particularly alluring because interest
representation is a central function of representative democracy; it is
the primary mechanism through which self-government is actualized.
Given the importance of interest representation to self-government,
representative institutions and structures assist in facilitating the goal
of self-government when they are open to entertaining the
multiplicity of interests present in the electorate at large. In short,
representatives respond to these interests. Though democratic
theorists have long debated how interests are to be representedobjective versus subjective representation or private versus publicthere is widespread agreement that it is interests that are to be
represented. 261 The promise of pluralism is that individual liberty is
best protected from encroachment-not by the Constitution or by the
government, but through group-based politics.
This standard account of pluralism has been criticized on many
fronts. However, its basic tenets-particularly as reformulated by the
neo-pluralists-continue to describe a basic truth of American
politics: representation and responsiveness in our representative
democracy are secured through participation in the political process
by various groups and the interests that they represent. This fact as
revealed by pluralism gives rise to at least one important implication.
Representative institutions must be open to all interests. What
representative institutions must not do is represent certain interests to
the exclusion of all others.262 When such biases exist-and
particularly when they are systematic and predictable-interest
representation simply becomes a device for undermining selfgovernment. Indeed, when used in this fashion, it will inevitably
260. ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST
CONFLICT AND CONSENT 326-27 (1967).

DEMOCRACY

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES:

261. PITKIN, supra note 211, at 113 (stating that representation is "an acting for others,
an activity in behalf of, in the interest of, as the agent of, someone else"); Charles E.
Gilbert, Operative Doctrines of Representation, 57 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 604, 604, 616
(1963).
262. This is the basis for E.E. Schattschneider's well-known criticism of pluralism; the
groups that affect public policy are not reflective of the interests of the electorate at large.
As he notes, the "system is skewed, loaded, and unbalanced in favor of a fraction of a
minority." E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST'S
VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 35 (1960); see also id. ("The flaw in the pluralist

heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent. Probably 90 per
cent of the people cannot get into the pressure system.").
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serve as a mechanism for replicating and furthering existing
inequalities. 2 6
The role of the Court then is to assure that
representative institutions are open to group interests. Thus, judicial
supervision is warranted where the Court intervenes not necessarily
to ensure responsiveness but to assure openness.
This bias in the representative structure is exactly what was at
issue in Baker. As some commentators have noted, state legislatures
generally, not just Tennessee's, were not at all open to urban

interests.26 Justice Douglas underscored the consequence of this lack
of openness in his concurrence. As he stated:
The National Institute of Municipal Law Officers has for
many years recognized the wide-spread complaint that by

far the greatest preponderance of state representatives and
senators are from rural areas which, in the main, fail to

become vitally interested in the increasing difficulties now
facing urban administrators.
Since World War II, the explosion in city and suburban
population has created intense local problems in education,
transportation, and housing.

Adequate handling of these

problems has not been possible to a large extent, due chiefly
to the political weakness of municipalities. This situation is
directly attributable to considerable under-representation of
cities in the legislatures of most states. 2 65
Justice Harlan replied in dissent:

I would hardly think it unconstitutional if a state
legislature's expressed reason for establishing or maintaining
an electoral imbalance between its rural and urban
population were to protect the State's agricultural interests
263. Professor Guinier advances a variant of this argument against the creation of
majority-minority districts as the primary method of representing the interests of African
Americans. See GUINIER, supra note 198, at 65.
264. As Andrew Hacker recounted:
The public soon began to notice that state legislatures were not responding to the
new concentrations of population. Rural and small-town lawmakers continued
to maintain majorities in the legislatures, and they displayed a marked
indifference to the needs of both cities and suburbs. Urban and suburban
citizens were cheerfully taxed, but their demands for legislation and
appropriations were virtually ignored.
ANDREW

HACKER,

CONGRESSIONAL

DISTRICrING:

THE

ISSUE

OF

EQUAL

REPRESENTATION 20 (1963); MCKAY, supra note 70, at 36-40; POWE, supra note 76, at
200 ("[R]ural control of mid-century state legislatures was a political fact of life."); see also
id. at 203 ("Baker would signal the end of rural domination of state legislatures and the
beginning of states dealing with the problems of urban majorities.").
265. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 248-49 n.4 (1962) (Douglas J., concurring) (quoting
the amicus brief filed by the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers).
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from the sheer weight of numbers of those residing in its
cities. A State may, after all, take account of the interests of
its rural population in the distribution of tax burdens ... and
recognition of the special problems of agricultural interests
has repeatedly been reflected legislation... 266
For Justice Harlan, the State could overrepresent,
by
malapportionment, some interests at the expense of others.
But the problem was not simply one of overrepresentation; it was
one of openness and ultimately of representation. The representative
system was structured in such a way as to be predictably and
systematically open and ultimately responsive to agricultural interests
to the exclusion of urban interests. The State's failure to be open to
the interests of the majority of its citizens left those citizens without
representation. 67 It is this absence of representation that motivated
the Court in Baker. As Justice Clark eloquently concluded in his
concurrence, "to be fully conformable to the principle of right, the
form of government must be representative." 2 6 He also could have
added that a truly representative form of government must also be
capable of being influenced by various interests. Otherwise, the
system suffers a failure of representation, at least as to those groups
that are not represented.
CONCLUSION

As Frankfurter perceptively recognized, judicial supervision of
democratic politics presents a problem. Though the problems of
democracy often cry out for judicial intervention, the Constitution is
often a poor guide. Frankfurter disregarded the utility of democratic
theory as a guide because "matters of political theory are beyond the
269
ordinary sphere of judges."
However, as I have argued in this Article, judges can-and
must-utilize democratic theory to direct their interpretation of the
Constitution. I described this approach as constitutional pluralism. It
is the contention that politics must reflect core democratic principles.
266. Id. at 336 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
267. HERZOG, supra note 201, at 213 (noting that "what's special about democracy is
responsiveness"); see also id. at 205 ("I suggest, any plausible account of legitimacy and
obligation must center on whether the state is for the most part responsive to the
people.").
268. The full quote reads, "[The Court's] decision today supports the proposition for
which our forebears fought and many died, namely, that to be fully conformable to the
principle of right, the form of government must be representative." Baker,369 U.S. at 261
(Clark, J., concurring).
269. Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874,891,901 (1994) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Judicial review is legitimate when the Court interferes with the
democratic process to enforce a core democratic principle. I have
articulated some examples of core democratic principles and have
traced those to the Court's opinion in Baker. Baker provides a
necessary blueprint and is rightly celebrated as an important moment
in the law of democracy.
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